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The Statutification of Tort Law
Involving the Workplace
Alex B. Long †
The phenomenon of the “tortification” of employment law involves the
consideration and importation of common law tort principles when interpreting
statutory anti-discrimination law. This Article explores the other side of the
coin: the “statutification” of tort law as it applies to the workplace. State courts
have only infrequently partaken in this enterprise, even in situations in which
the two areas of law involve similar issues. This Article suggests that at least
some limited form of statutification of tort law as it pertains to the workplace
might be useful.
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INTRODUCTION
Linda was a janitorial employee whose job involved dusting and
vacuuming offices, mopping and waxing floors, and similar tasks. One day,
Linda was injured on the job when she slipped and fell trying to replace a
water dispenser. She filed to collect workers’ compensation benefits. Shortly
after, she received a notice that she was being reassigned from the main
company offices to “the Annex.” The Annex is a twenty-thousand-squarefoot facility that is isolated from the rest of the workplace, with no windows
or fans. The lights are motion activated. The area contains rats, bats, pigeons,
ducks, and raccoons—and their waste. Employees at the facility viewed
assignment to the Annex as punishment for perceived transgressions.
Employees were typically only assigned to work there a maximum of once
per week; Linda was assigned to work there on a full-time basis. As part of
her new assignment, Linda had to deal with and clean up after the various
pests. On one occasion, Linda was chased down an aisle by a rat. There was
no place to sit in the Annex, which posed a special problem for Linda as she
recovered from her injury. Linda believed that her employer assigned her to
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the Annex in retaliation for having filed her workers’ compensation claim, so
she sought the advice of a lawyer. 1
Had Linda’s employer retaliated against her for exercising her rights
under a federal statute, such as the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 2 or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 3 she would probably
have had a claim. Retaliation is prohibited under Title VII where the action
is “materially adverse,” i.e., where the action “could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 4
Federal courts have adopted this same standard for anti-retaliation provisions
in other federal employment statutes such as the FMLA. 5 Common sense
suggests that the possibility of being reassigned to a dark, vermin-infested
location on a full-time basis would probably be enough to deter a reasonable
employee from taking action protected under Title VII or the FMLA.
But Linda’s options under state tort law would be much more limited.
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is rare to begin
with, and courts are particularly reluctant to recognize such claims based on
employer conduct in the workplace. 6 Indeed, in the actual case on which this
hypothetical is based, the court granted summary judgment to the employer,
finding that the employer’s conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary to support an IIED claim. 7 Had Linda been
fired, she might have had a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of
public policy, which, as discussed in this Article, provides a tort remedy
where an employee’s discharge threatens an important public policy. 8 But
Linda was not fired; she was “only” reassigned to an objectively less
desirable position. 9 And as this Article discusses, the majority of courts to
1. The facts of this hypothetical case are taken directly from Gibbs v. Voith Indus. Servs., Inc., 60
F. Supp. 3d 780, 787–801 (E.D. Mich. 2014). The only significant difference is that the plaintiff in the
actual case alleged that the employer had retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Id. at 798.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2018).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
4. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir.
2006).
6. See GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 613 (Tex. 1999) (stating that supervisory conduct
rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct “only in the most unusual of circumstances”).
7. Gibbs v. Voith Indus. Servs., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 780, 802–03 (E D. Mich. 2014).
8. See infra notes 256–265 and accompanying text.
9. Another possibility would be for Linda to argue that she had been constructively discharged,
which would satisfy the termination requirement for purposes of a retaliatory discharge claim. See, e.g.,
Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 774–75 (N.H. 2002). A constructive discharge occurs where the
employer creates working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee under the circumstances
would be compelled to quit. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015). However,
in many jurisdictions, this is a demanding standard, requiring something along the lines of threats of
physical harm or shocking, outrageous, coercive, or unconscionable employer conduct. See Swidnicki v.
Brunswick Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 921, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Reberg v. Rd. Equip., No. 2:04 CV 368 PS,
2005 WL 3320780, at *9–10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2005); Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803
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consider the issue have declined to recognize a tort action for retaliatory
discipline in violation of public policy. 10
Linda’s case is an example of how the law governing the workplace
often fails to provide a remedy to employees who may fall through the cracks
of a workplace protection statute.
“Statutification,” a term I use to describe the application of statutory
principles in judicial interpretations of state tort law, has the potential to
address the problems Linda and similarly situated employees face.
Numerous scholars have discussed the so-called “tortification” of
employment law. 11 This phenomenon involves the consideration and
importation of common law tort principles when interpreting statutory antidiscrimination law. 12 This Article explores the other side of the coin: the
statutification of tort law as it applies to the workplace.
Like its counterpart, the statutification of tort law involves the
consideration, and sometimes the importation, of principles derived from
statutory law when considering related tort law issues. This Article suggests
that increased statutification of workplace tort law would, in some instances,
supply needed protections for workers. For example, in Linda’s case, a court
could recognize a tort of retaliatory discipline based on the principle—
established by Title VII and further developed by courts interpreting other
federal employment statutes—that adverse actions short of discharge may
amount to retaliation.
Statutification is a relatively common phenomenon in tort law in
general. 13 But federal employment statutes have had only a limited impact on
tort law involving the workplace. Given the obvious overlap between
statutory law and tort law regulating the workplace, this is somewhat
surprising. As Professor Michael Harper has observed, there is the potential
for a “federal-state lawmaking enterprise” in which state tort law is
A.2d 611, 628 (N.J. 2002). Some courts require a showing that the employer acted with the intention of
forcing the employee to quit. See, e.g., Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073,
1080 (6th Cir. 1999); Pribil v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 533 N.W.2d 410, 412 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995).
10. See infra notes 267–313 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will
The Case Against “Tortification” of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994); Charles
A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012).
12. For a representative sampling of scholarly articles on the subject, see Sandra F. Sperino,
Discrimination Law The New Franken-Tort, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 721 (2016); Martha Chamallas, Two
Very Different Stories Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315 (2014);
W. Jonathan Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1129 (2014); William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur A Proposal to Let
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447 (2013); Sandra F. Sperino,
Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 34 (2013);
Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 437, 519 (2002).
13. See infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text.
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influenced by the Supreme Court’s resolution of “analogous issues under the
federal statutes.” 14 But as this Article discusses, state courts have only
infrequently partaken in this enterprise.
The relationship between statutory law and tort law is perhaps
undertheorized to begin with. 15 Judges have quite different conceptions of the
proper role of tort law for dealing with broad societal concerns, 16 which only
makes developing a workable approach to statutification more challenging.
But courts’ lack of thoughtfulness about how statutory law governing the
workplace could and should shape tort law in the area is particularly jarring
given that statutory law now impacts virtually every aspect of the
workplace. 17 This Article suggests that at least some limited form of
statutification of tort law involving the workplace might be useful in ensuring
that workers do not fall through the cracks of employment protection laws.
Therefore, this Article attempts to offer some pragmatic suggestions as to
how courts might use statutory law to assist in the development of tort law
regulating the workplace.
Part I explores the judicial practice of tortification of employment law,
including criticisms of this practice, to set the stage for analyzing
tortification’s counterpart—statutification. Part II turns to the general failure
of state courts to statutify tort law governing the workplace. This Part
provides several examples of situations in which one might expect statutory
law to have influenced tort law where it has not done so. Part III explores
why state courts might be reluctant to look to statutory law when considering
common law tort issues involving the workplace and suggests that there may
be instances in which tort law principles can be sharpened through an
examination of decisional law involving employment discrimination statutes.
Finally, Part IV focuses extensively on perhaps the clearest example of a
situation that might benefit from some statutification: cases involving the
largely unrecognized tort of retaliatory discipline in violation of public
policy, in which an employer retaliates against an employee but stops short
of actually discharging the employee.

14. Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law for Employment in an Age of Statutes,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1284–85, 1337 (2015).
15. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957, 961 (2014) (noting
“the lack of systematic analysis concerning the relation between” statutes and the common law of torts).
16. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of competing visions of what the role of tort law in the
workplace should be.
17. See Jessica L. Roberts, Rethinking Employment Discrimination Harms, 91 IND. L.J. 393, 401
(2016) (noting “the proliferation of federal employment discrimination statutes”); William R. Corbett, The
Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 97 (2003) (noting “the
general proliferation of statutes regulating the workplace”).
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I. THE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
To understand the potential benefits of statutification, it is important to
consider the existing practice of tortification and its criticisms. Tortification
of employment law refers to federal courts’ practice of importing common
law tort principles into the interpretation of federal statutes involving the
workplace. The term is most frequently used in the employment
discrimination context, in which federal courts have borrowed a great deal
from tort law and have increasingly viewed Title VII and other discrimination
statutes as establishing statutory torts. 18
A. Examples of the Tortification of Employment Law
While the phenomenon of tortification has attracted significant attention
in academic literature in recent years, the general practice of courts using
common law principles to fill gaps found in statutory language is not new. 19
Whether a court is reviewing an older, vaguely worded “common law
statute,” where it is assumed courts will develop the meaning of the statute
over time, or a more precisely worded second-generation statute, courts have
long looked to common law to help flesh out the meaning of statutory
provisions. 20
Courts have adopted a similar approach when interpreting employment
discrimination statutes. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 21 by far the
most important Supreme Court decision on the subject of employment
discrimination under Title VII, the Supreme Court adopted a framework that
closely resembles the tort theory of res ipsa loquitur. 22 In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court devised a burden-shifting framework for disparate

18. See, e.g., Sperino, The New Franken-Tort, supra note 12, at 721–22 (describing this practice by
the Supreme Court).
19. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1052 (1989); Maureen E. Brady, Property and Projection, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1187 (2020)
(“[M]any statutes follow on the heels of common law cases or make use of common law principles to
articulate rules and standards.”).
20. See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1051 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of common law rules
as a way to fill in statutory gaps); Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and Statutory
Interpretation A Response to William Baude, 9 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 45–46 (2018) (discussing the
different approaches to statutory interpretation with respect to common law statutes and “normal”
statutes).
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 454 (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas pretext proof structure is a thinly
veiled version of res ipsa loquitur . . . .”); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules Doctrine as Discrimination in
a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 85 (1998) (observing that the Court’s subsequent
explanation of the McDonnell Douglas framework “strongly echoes the res ipsa loquitur procedural
framework”); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology The Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 982 n.258 (1995) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas framework “resembles
the res ipsa loquitur model in the law of torts”).
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treatment claims. 23 Once the plaintiff shows that they were rejected for a
position for which they were qualified, the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case of discrimination. 24 At this point, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its
action. 25 If the defendant articulates such a reason, the plaintiff may carry the
ultimate burden of persuasion by then showing that the proffered explanation
is pretextual. 26 This entire approach is based on the assumption that there is
often a lack of direct evidence of discrimination. The Supreme Court has
reasoned that “when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have
been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more
likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration . . . .” 27
Moreover, as the employer is in the better position to identify the actual
reason for the adverse action, it is fair to place the burden on the employer to
identify that reason. 28 In this respect, the Supreme Court has described the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach as a commonsense approach
that reflects “common experience as it bears on the critical question of
discrimination.” 29
The tort theory of res ipsa loquitur is strikingly similar. Courts often
describe res ipsa as a commonsense theory that offers a likely explanation for
a result in the absence of direct evidence of the defendant’s negligence. 30 Res
ipsa allows a plaintiff to establish a presumption or inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant by virtue of the mere occurrence of an event
under circumstances that common sense tells us was unlikely to have
happened absent negligence. 31 As is the case in Title VII, courts applying the
res ipsa theory note that this shifting presumption is justified on the grounds
that the party who was in control of the instrumentality that caused the
accident “is in a superior position to explain what went wrong and why.” 32
Thus, although the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas did not explicitly
23.

411 U.S. at 802.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 804.
27. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
28. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 130, 147 (2000) (justifying the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach in part on the ground that “the employer is in the best
position to put forth the actual reason for its decision”).
29. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
30. See McDaid v. Aztec W. Condo. Ass’n, 189 A.3d 321, 328 (N.J. 2018) (“The res ipsa doctrine
advances the common-sense notion that the party who maintains exclusive control over the object that
goes awry and causes injury is in a superior position to explain what went wrong and why.”); Barretta v.
Otis Elevator Co., 698 A.2d 810, 812 (Conn. 1997) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of common
sense and not a rule of law which dispenses with proof of negligence.”).
31. See Gilmer v. S. Ry. Co., 120 S.E.2d 294, 296 (Va. 1961) (summarizing the theory).
32. McDaid, 189 A.3d at 328.
24.
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incorporate tort law into its Title VII jurisprudence, the Court certainly seems
to have been channeling it. 33
Courts have relied upon tort law in a number of other decisions involving
employment discrimination statutes. In the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 34 several justices brought tort law to the fore
in a debate over the appropriate standard of causation and burden of proof in
Title VII cases. 35 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, cited Prosser and Keeton on Torts in support of the position that
Title VII’s language prohibiting discrimination “because of” sex established
a but-for causation standard. 36 In her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor
drew upon tort decisions in which the law shifted the burden from the plaintiff
to the defendants to establish that their actions were not the cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries. 37 In the process, Justice O’Connor referred to Title VII as
creating a “statutory employment ‘tort’” (with the word “tort” notably in
quotations). 38 Since Price Waterhouse, tort law has come to play an
increasing role in federal employment discrimination cases.
Nearly ten years later in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 39 the
avoidable consequences doctrine from tort law played a role in the Court’s
decision about employer liability for supervisor harassment. 40 The issue
facing the Court in Ellerth was if an employer should face liability when a
supervisor engages in sexually harassing behavior but the employee does not
suffer a tangible employment action (such as discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment) as a result of the harassment. 41 The Court had
previously looked to common law to interpret Title VII in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, where it relied upon principles from common law
agency doctrine to help define actionable sexual harassment. 42 In Ellerth, the
Court once again looked to the common law of torts for guidance, casually
remarking that Title VII “borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences
doctrine.” 43 The avoidable consequences doctrine imposes upon an injured
party an obligation to make reasonable efforts to minimize the damages

33. See Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1996) (referring to the McDonnell
Douglas framework as “a cousin of res ipsa loquitur”).
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
35. See id. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 281–82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 281–82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing tort cases involving multiple causation
issues).
38. Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
39. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
40. Id. at 764.
41. Id. at 747, 761.
42. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (agreeing that Congress wanted
courts to look to agency principles in determining employer liability under Title VII).
43. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
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caused by a tortfeasor. 44 Relying upon this principle, the Court concluded that
where an employee has not suffered a tangible employment action resulting
from sexual harassment, an employer may avoid liability by showing that the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or otherwise to avoid
harm. 45
In more recent years, the Court has looked to tort law to flesh out the
causation standards under different statutes. In Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., the Court concluded that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) requires a plaintiff to establish that age was a “butfor” cause of the employer’s adverse action. 46 The ADEA prohibits
discrimination “because of” the plaintiff’s age. 47 In support of its conclusion
that the statute necessarily incorporated a but-for standard of causation, the
Court again cited Prosser and Keeton on Torts, among other sources. 48 The
majority’s conclusion that tort law’s familiar but-for standard applied
prompted Justice Breyer to write in dissent about the inappropriateness of
adopting the tort standard when attempting to divine a defendant’s motive. 49
In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Court explicitly classified an
employment discrimination statute as a “federal tort” and drew heavily upon
tort law in devising a rule for so-called “cat’s paw” scenarios. 50 Staub
involved a claim, brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 51 that the plaintiff’s employer should
be held liable when a supervisor influenced, but did not directly take, an
adverse employment action on the basis of antimilitary animus. 52 USERRA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual’s membership in the
military where the individual’s membership was a “motivating factor” in the
employer’s adverse action. 53 The case was difficult because the ultimate
decision-maker had no antimilitary animus, but his actions had allegedly
been influenced by an individual who did. 54 In an attempt to construct a
workable rule, Justice Scalia made the connection between tort law and
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[O]ne injured by the tort of
another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable
effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort.”).
45. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
46. 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2018).
48. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77.
49. Id. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011). In a “cat’s paw” case, the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer liable
“for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision.” Id.
at 415.
51. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (2018).
52. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
53. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c).
54. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
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employment discrimination law explicit. 55 To Justice Scalia, tort law supplied
the appropriate rule because “when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts
the background of general tort law.” 56 Therefore, USERRA’s causation
requirement “incorporates the traditional tort-law concept of proximate
cause.” 57 Ultimately, the Court held that “if a supervisor performs an act
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause
an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the
ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.” 58
Finally, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
the Court again cited Prosser and Keeton and borrowed tort law’s but-for
causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims. 59 According to the
majority opinion, it was “textbook tort law that an action ‘is not regarded as
a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it.’” 60
As this but-for causation standard was the default rule for tort law in the
majority’s view, Congress was presumed to have incorporated that rule when
it enacted Title VII. 61 In 2020, the Court in two opinions reaffirmed that the
but-for causation standard remains the default rule in statutory discrimination
cases. 62 And Prosser and Keeton once again made an appearance in support
of the but-for standard being the default rule, albeit in a dissent. 63
B. Criticisms of the Tortification Phenomenon
The tortfication phenomenon has been the subject of substantial
criticism. As discussed later in this Article, some of these criticisms have
relevance to the question of whether statutification—the other side of the
tortification coin—is desirable. 64 There are at least three general criticisms of
the tortification phenomenon. 65

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 422.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
Id. at 347 (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed.

60.
1984)).
61. See id.
62. See Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1172 (2020) (stating that the but-for standard remains the
default rule in discrimination cases); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (“Title VII’s
‘because of’ test incorporates the ‘simple’ and ‘traditional’ standard of but-for causation.”) (quoting
Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360).
63. Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1179 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. See infra Part III.C.
65. It bears mentioning that not all of the criticisms of conflating tort law and employment
discrimination law come from academics. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 774 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Popular misconceptions notwithstanding, sexual harassment is not a
freestanding federal tort, but a form of employment discrimination.”).
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The first criticism is that it is inappropriate for courts to import tort
principles into the interpretation of federal employment discrimination
statutes to begin with. As Professor Sandra F. Sperino has pointed out, the
language used in federal employment discrimination statutes does not track
the language of tort law. 66 Yet, the Supreme Court has not only looked to tort
law to help interpret such statutes but has also directly imported some of this
law. 67 For example, no major employment discrimination statute uses the
term “proximate cause,” yet the Supreme Court has imported tort law’s
proximate causation standards into the interpretation of such statutes. 68 In a
manner foreign to tort law, Title VII articulates a somewhat complicated
causation standard that first requires a plaintiff to establish that a protected
characteristic played a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse
decision. 69 Despite this, the Supreme Court has looked to tort law principles
to flesh out causation principles for Title VII and other discrimination
statutes. 70 As another example, Professor Michael J. Frank has observed that,
“although there is no real textual support for an application of the avoidable
consequences doctrine to Title VII, . . . the Supreme Court [has] applied a
modified (and more defendant-friendly) version of this doctrine to
supervisory harassment cases.” 71
At a more basic level, employment discrimination law is not drawn from
tort law involving the workplace to begin with. 72 At the time Title VII was
enacted in 1964, for example, the employment-at-will rule dominated state
law involving the workplace, and the various tort-based incursions upon that
rule had not been fully developed. 73 Nothing in Title VII’s legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to incorporate common law tort principles. 74
Indeed, Title VII represented a momentous change to the traditional law

66.

Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 12, at 28.
See supra notes 21–63 and accompanying text.
68. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011).
69. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 12, at 18 (noting that the causation standard
employed in Title VII does not mimic traditional tort causation standards).
70. See id. (discussing the Court’s use of tort principles in developing a causation standard under
the ADEA).
71. Frank, supra note 12, at 510 (footnote omitted).
72. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 12, at 29.
73. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress did not appear in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts until 1965. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). And while a few
courts had recognized a tort claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, which served to
limit the scope of the at-will rule, the tort was still far from fully formed at the time Title VII was enacted.
See infra notes 257–260 and accompanying text.
74. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 12, at 31 (“There is no legislative history for
Title VII that suggests its primary operative provisions derive from a common-law tradition.”); Corbett,
supra note 12, at 456 (“When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court would have characterized the federal employment discrimination law as a statutory
tort.”).
67.
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governing the employment relationship. 75 Thus, as Professor Sperino has
observed, “it is unclear why judges would look to the common law to define
terms in a statutory regime whose operative provisions are not drawn from
the common law and that does not mimic the common law.” 76
The second chief criticism concerning courts’ importation of tort
principles into federal employment law is that courts often make a hash of
the law in doing so. Oddly, the Court has imported causation standards
established in negligence cases for use in disparate treatment discrimination
claims, which focus on an actor’s intent to discriminate. 77 As mentioned, the
Court has held that tort law’s strict but-for causation standard applies in the
age discrimination and Title VII retaliation contexts, 78 even though tort law
traditionally employs a different causation standard when there are multiple
causes at work. 79 The Court’s decision in Staub to import tort principles of
proximate cause—one of the most amorphous and unpredictable concepts in
tort law—into discrimination cases opens up a host of potentially difficult
issues in future cases. 80 Indeed, the Staub Court’s conception of proximate
cause omits any mention of foreseeability, a concept sometimes described as
the “touchstone” of proximate cause 81 and that is used by the overwhelming
majority of state courts in defining the concept. 82 In addition, several authors
75. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 12, at 31 (noting that Title VII created
significant exceptions to the at-will rule).
76. Id. at 33.
77. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1459 (explaining that the proximate cause concept “has been
primarily utilized for negligence, and a disparate-treatment Title VII violation is more akin to an
intentional tort”).
78. See supra notes 46–49, 59–63 and accompanying text.
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) (“If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause
of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual
cause of the harm.”).
80. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 459 (“As troublesome as proximate cause has been in tort law, its
adoption in employment discrimination law does not bode well.”); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1459
(suggesting that lower courts will spend years attempting to interpret Staub).
81. J.T. Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (S.C. 2006).
82. Section 29 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts dispenses with the phrase “proximate cause” and
explains that “[a]n actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s
conduct tortious.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). The comments clarify that the focus will still often be on whether the plaintiff’s
harm was a foreseeable risk of the defendant’s tortious conduct. Id. § 29 cmt. d & e & illus. 8. In Staub,
the Court explained that “[p]roximate cause requires only ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted
and the injurious conduct alleged,’ and excludes only those ‘link[s] that [are] too remote, purely
contingent, or indirect.’” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 (2011) (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v.
City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). There are certainly some jurisdictions that, like Staub, focus
primarily on the strength of the causal connection when defining proximate cause. See, e.g., Patton v.
Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 731 (Ky. 2016) (“Proximate causation captures the notion that, although
conduct in breach of an established duty may be an actual but-for cause of plaintiff’s damages, it is
nevertheless too attenuated from the damages in time, place, or foreseeability to reasonably impose
liability upon the defendant.”). But the majority of state courts explicitly incorporate foreseeability into
the definition of proximate cause or do so through adoption of the Restatement (Third) approach. See, e.g.,
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have argued that the vicarious liability rules developed by the Court in Ellerth
do not reflect traditional tort and agency principles. 83 The result of this
awkward grafting of tort law principles onto discrimination statutes is what
Professor Sperino has referred to as “Franken-tort,” a statutory employment
discrimination tort whose component pieces “only vaguely resemble the
component pieces from which it was drawn.” 84
The third general criticism of the tortification of employment law is that,
by turning Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes into what are
effectively statutory torts, courts have improperly shifted the focus of these
statutes from elimination of workplace discrimination to almost exclusively
compensation. 85 While Title VII has always provided for monetary remedies,
the original focus of the statute was to eliminate workplace discrimination. 86
Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 347 P.3d 606, 614 n.5 (Colo. 2015) (“[F]oreseeability is the touchstone
of proximate cause.”); Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1125 (D.C. 2009) (“To establish proximate
cause, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that there was a direct
and substantial causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of the standard of care and the
plaintiff’s injuries and that the injuries were foreseeable.”); Ruiz v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, Inc., 260
So. 3d 977, 982 (Fla. 2018) (“A harm is ‘proximate’ in a legal sense if prudent human foresight would
lead one to expect that similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by the specific act or omission in
question.”); Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1124 (Ill. 2015) (“[L]egal cause involves an
assessment of foreseeability.”); Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 907 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Mass. 2009) (citing
Restatement (Third) of Torts and stating that liability only exists “where the resulting injury is within the
scope of the foreseeable risk arising from the negligent conduct”); Torbit v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 153
A.3d 847, 855 (Md. 2017) (“[L]egal causation most often involves a determination of whether the injuries
were a foreseeable result of the negligent conduct.”); Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 479
(Mich. 1994) (“On the other hand, legal cause or ‘proximate cause’ normally involves examining the
foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held legally responsible for such
consequences.”); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Ohio 1989) (“[I]n order to establish
proximate cause, foreseeability must be found.”); Piazza v. Kellim, 377 P.3d 492, 499–500 (Or. 2016) (en
banc) (defining proximate cause in terms of whether “the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable”); Univ.
of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 518 (Tex. 2019) (“Proximate cause
has two components: cause in fact and foreseeability.”); Interim Pers. of Cent. Va., Inc. v. Messer, 559
S.E.2d 704, 708 (Va. 2002) (“Generally, in order to warrant a finding that negligence is the proximate
cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent
or wrongful act, and that the injury should have been foreseen in the light of the attending
circumstances.”).
83. See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day’s Work Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment,
104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2002) (referring to the Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher as “bad
applications of imperfectly understood legal rules”); Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for
Harassment Under Title VII A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41,
55 (1999) (arguing that the Court’s recognition of an affirmative defense for employers had no basis in
common law decisions).
84. Sperino, The New Franken-Tort, supra note 12, at 722.
85. See Chamallas, supra note 12, at 1316 (observing that “Title VII has been reshaped from an
enterprise liability scheme to a ‘statutory tort,’ capable of redressing a limited number of wrongs done to
individual employees, but largely incapable of achieving Title VII’s broad purpose of deterring and
eradicating workplace discrimination”).
86. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (recognizing the compensatory
function of Title VII but stating that its “‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence
primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm”); Corbett, supra note 12, at 456–57 (citing
legislative history and stating that “Title VII was primarily a public policy and civil rights statute aimed
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By conceptualizing Title VII as a statutory tort designed primarily to provide
compensation, critics charge that courts give short shrift to the broader public
policy goals of deterring and eliminating discrimination. 87 For example,
Professor Michael Selmi has argued that “monetary relief is the principal,
and often the sole, goal” of Title VII litigation. 88
II. THE LACK OF STATUTIFICATION OF TORT LAW
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE
The other side of the tortification coin is the relative lack of influence
that employment statutes have had on state tort law as it relates to the
employment relationship. 89 As discussed below, statutory law has had
considerable influence on common law tort principles generally. However,
in the employment context, federal statutory law has had only a limited
influence on the development of tort law governing the workplace. In
situations in which state courts might be expected to incorporate concepts
developed in disputes under federal employment discrimination statutes,
federal law has often played a limited role in influencing tort law involving
the same issues. This is somewhat surprising in light of the increasing
statutification of state tort law more generally.
A. The Statutification of Tort Law in General
The primary source of common law rulemaking has historically been
judge-made law, specifically the decisions of appellate judges. 90 Today,
statutes obviously play a huge role in the work of judges, forcing them to
consider how statutes fit within the preexisting body of common law. 91 Tort
law is no different.

at eradicating, in the employment setting, the most socially caustic and destructive forms of discrimination
that had blighted the nation throughout its history”).
87. See Chamallas, supra note 12, at 1316.
88. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251–52 (2003).
89. In contrast, federal employment statutes do influence state statutory laws governing the
workplace. State courts routinely borrow from federal decisions when interpreting their own parallel antidiscrimination statutes, and some states have articulated a preference for parallel construction of these
statutes. See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .” Divergent Interpretations of State
and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 477 (2006) (noting that state courts
have routinely adopted the federal courts’ interpretations of parallel federal law with little or no
independent analysis of the applicable state statute); Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing Deference Learning
Lessons from Recent Congressional Rejection of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Discrimination
Statutes, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 40, 41 (2009) (noting that state courts routinely follow Supreme Court
precedent when interpreting similar state anti-discrimination statutes).
90. See J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 363 (2019).
91. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law Employment, Alcohol,
and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 940 (2000).
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Statutes play an increasingly central role in tort law generally. In some
instances, statutes have completely changed or eliminated entire areas of tort
law. For example, comparative fault statutes have almost completely
replaced the traditional common law rule that contributory negligence bars a
plaintiff’s recovery in a negligence action. 92 So-called “anti-heart balm”
statutes have eliminated the torts of criminal conversation and alienation of
affections in a majority of jurisdictions. 93 In other situations, state legislatures
have enacted statutes that regulate areas that were historically the domain of
tort law, such as statutes immunizing shopkeepers against false imprisonment
claims stemming from the detainment of suspected shoplifters. 94 Sometimes,
these statutes directly involve the workplace, as is the case with statutes
providing employers with a limited privilege from defamation actions when
they provide employment references 95 and statutes addressing privacy in the
workplace. 96
These are all examples in which legislatures have imposed new statutory
tort rules upon common law courts. But courts have also been willing to
statutify tort law on their own by importing state and federal statutory and
constitutional principles into preexisting tort law, even when statutes do not
require them to do so. 97 The most obvious example is the theory of negligence
per se, in which a standard of conduct defined in a statute articulates the
standard of care for a negligence claim, replacing the more generic tort
standard of reasonable care. 98 State products liability law—some of it
92. See David C. Sobelsohn, “Pure” vs. “Modified” Comparative Fault Notes on the Debate, 34
EMORY L.J. 65, 70 (1985) (noting in 1985 that “the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions
have adopted, by statute,” a form of modified comparative fault).
93. Kelsey M. May, Bachelors Beware The Current Validity and Future Feasibility of a Cause of
Action for Breach of Promise to Marry, 45 TULSA L. REV. 331, 337 (2009) (noting that causes of action
that give rise to liability for “having an affair” or “procuring the affections of another’s spouse” have been
barred in a majority of jurisdictions, most often by statute).
94. See, e.g., Barkley v. McKeever Enters., Inc., 456 S.W.3d 829, 834 (Mo. 2015) (discussing the
legislature’s codification of the common law privilege for shopkeepers into statute).
95. See Alex B. Long, The Forgotten Role of Consent in Defamation and Employment Reference
Cases, 66 FLA. L. REV. 719, 725 (2014) (noting that reference immunity statutes largely track common
law rules).
96. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (2019) (prohibiting employers from requiring employees
to disclose passwords for their social media accounts).
97. One context in which states courts have had no choice but to incorporate constitutional law
principles is defamation. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that
a public official suing for defamation must, as a constitutional matter, establish actual malice on the part
of the defendant).
98. See Winger v. C.M. Holdings, L.L.C , 881 N.W.2d 433, 446 (Iowa 2016) (describing the
principle of negligence per se); Barry L. Johnson, Why Negligence Per Se Should Be Abandoned, 20
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 249 (2017) (“[T]he negligence per se doctrine supplants this opentextured, case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior under the circumstances,
compelling the conclusion that an actor was negligent solely on the basis of that actor’s violation of a
statute or ordinance.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 cmt. a Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“The violation of federal statutes and
regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.”). But see Barbara
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developed through common law rulemaking—regularly deals with federal
statutory and administrative standards. 99
There are other examples. Some courts have imported large swaths of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when developing the privacy tort of
intrusion upon the seclusion. 100 Antitrust scholars have noted that the Merger
Guidelines developed by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have heavily influenced the common law regarding
competition. 101 Federal aviation regulations concerning navigable airspace
help define the contours of the tort of trespass to land. 102 These regulations
may also help define a landowner’s privacy interests with respect to the tort
of intrusion upon the seclusion in the case of drones intruding upon the
airspace of landowners. 103
The tort of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy provides
another clear example. With the retaliatory discharge tort, state courts seek
to determine when an employer’s discharge of an employee offends public
policy. 104 In order to divine the relevant public policy, courts look to positive
law, typically statutes. 105 The statutes in question may have no direct
connection to the workplace, but they nonetheless help define the public
policy that is jeopardized by an employer’s actions. Thus, external positive
sources of law are baked into the tort. In each of these situations, courts have
chosen to bring principles derived from external sources into existing tort law
in an effort to better define its contours.

Kritchevsky, Tort Law is State Law Why Courts Should Distinguish State and Federal Law in
Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2010) (acknowledging that the majority of
states treat a violation of federal statute as negligence per se but arguing against this approach).
99. See Donald L. Doernberg, The Supreme Court’s Cloaking Device “[C]ongressional Judgment
About the Sound Division of Labor Between State and Federal Courts”, 50 MCGEORGE L. REV. 539, 552
(2019) (discussing the application of federal standards in state products liability actions); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (“[A] product’s noncompliance with an
applicable product safety statute . . . renders the product defective . . . .”).
100. See, e.g., Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs., Inc., 4 A.3d 170, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2010) (relying upon Fourth Amendment principles in helping to define the tort of intrusion upon the
seclusion of another).
101. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust
Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 772 (2006) (stating that the Merger Guidelines have “had an
undue influence upon common law development”).
102. See A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1, 23–26 (2015) (discussing the impact of federal aviation law on landowners’ rights).
103. See id. at 32–37 (discussing the tort in the context of drones).
104. See David C. Yamada, Voices From the Cubicle Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee
Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (1998) (“The public policy
exception creates a cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employer fires a worker for reasons
that violate or offend public policy.”).
105. See John E. Lippl, Predicting the Success of Wrongful Discharge-Public Policy Actions In
Tennessee and Beyond, 58 TENN. L. REV. 393, 402–03 (1991) (noting that statutes and regulations “are
the most fertile source of public policy” in wrongful discharge claims).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925262

2021

STATUTIFICATION OF TORT LAW

387

B. The Relative Lack of Statutification of Tort Law Involving the
Workplace: Some Preliminary Examples
With the notable exception of the retaliatory discharge tort mentioned
above, there has been relatively little statutification of tort law as it involves
the workplace. To be sure, federal and state decisions interpreting
employment discrimination statutes have had some influence on tort law
governing the workplace. For example, numerous state courts have imported
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach originally developed in
Title VII discrimination cases for use in common-law retaliatory discharge
cases. 106 At the same time, however, a significant number of state courts have
expressly rejected use of the McDonnell Douglas approach in retaliatory
discharge cases or otherwise employ a more traditional tort approach in
which an employer must establish that its actions were justified by legitimate
business reasons. 107
There are other situations in which one might expect concepts developed
in the federal employment context to influence tort law governing the
workplace. For example, it is well established in federal retaliation decisions
that an individual who opposes what the individual believes to be unlawful
discrimination is still protected from employer retaliation even if the
employer conduct is not actually unlawful, provided the individual’s belief
as to the unlawfulness of the conduct was reasonable. 108 But there are several
common law retaliatory discharge cases in which courts insist, in the face of
these well-established federal statutory retaliation decisions, that employees

106. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 65 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002); Nelson v. United
Techs., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 248–49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Rebarchek v. Farmers Coop. Elevator, 35 P.3d
892, 898 (Kan. 2001); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Minn. 1987); Riesen
v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 717 N.W.2d 907, 917 (Neb. 2006); Johnson v. Kreiser’s, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225,
227–28 (S.D. 1988); Lawrence v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., No. E2016–02169–COA–R3–
CV, 2017 WL 4476858, at *8–9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2017); Mellin v. Flood Brook Union Sch. Dist.,
790 A.2d 408, 417–18 (Vt. 2001); King v. Cowboy Dodge, Inc., 357 P.3d 755, 760 (Wyo. 2015); see also
Martin v. Gonzaga Univ., 425 P.3d 837, 843 (Wash. 2018) (employing a four-part test in retaliatory
discharge cases with the second step tracking the McDonnell Douglas approach).
107. See Michael v. Precision All. Grp., LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183, 1189 (Ill. 2014) (noting the court’s
prior rejection of the three-part federal test for discrimination for use in retaliatory discharge cases);
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (recognizing tort action
but not announcing a burden-shifting approach); Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d
443, 453–54 (Wis. 2000) (holding that employer may avoid liability by establishing that the discharge
was for just cause); Wounaris v. W. Va. State Coll., 588 S.E.2d 406, 413 (W. Va. 2003) (“An employer
may rebut an employee’s prima facie case of wrongful discharge . . . by demonstrating that it had a
plausible and legitimate business reason to justify the discharge.”).
108. See, e.g., Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 14 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“An employee’s complaint may qualify as protected activity . . . ‘so long as the employee has’
. . . ‘a good faith, reasonable belief that [the employee] was opposing an employment practice made
unlawful by Title VII.’”) (quoting Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001); McMenemy v. City
of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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are only protected where the conduct they opposed was actually illegal. 109
And in some cases, the courts have adopted this stricter rule for tort claims
even while adopting the more lenient “reasonable belief” approach for
statutory retaliation claims. 110
As another example, recent federal decisions on the appropriate
causation standards under anti-discrimination statutes have had only limited
influence on state tort law governing the workplace. Depending upon the
statute or issue in question, federal decisions employ a host of different
causation standards that plaintiffs must satisfy. 111 Beginning with its decision
in Nassar, the Supreme Court has started referring to the but-for standard of
causation as the “default rule” when interpreting federal employment
discrimination statutes. 112 Nassar has had some influence in terms of state
courts’ interpretation of parallel state statutes. 113 But the but-for standard is
certainly not the norm in analogous common law retaliatory discharge claims
at the state level. The Nassar decision has not caused state courts to reevaluate their preexisting causation standards in common law retaliatory
discharge claims. Instead, less stringent causation standards are the norm in
these claims, whether it is a “substantial factor” standard, 114 a “motivating
factor” standard, 115 a “substantial motivating factor” standard, 116 a
109. See Callantine v. Staff Builders, Inc., 271 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Missouri
law); Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Mississippi law); Bereston
v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95, 106 (D.C. 2016); Holden v. Univ. Sys. of Md., 112 A.3d 1100, 1107
(Md. Ct. App. 2015); Kendall v. Integrated Interiors, Inc., No. 283494, 2009 WL 3321515, at *7 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2009). There are also decisions that adopt the federal approach and hold that a reasonable
belief is all that is required. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992); Ellis v.
City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Wash. 2000) (en banc); Webber v. Wight & Co., 858 N.E.2d 579,
595 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
110. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994).
111. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013) (applying but-for standard
in retaliation cases under Title VII); Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 269–74 (3d Cir. 2017)
(holding that the “motivating factor” test applies to FMLA retaliation claims); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med.
Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying but-for standard in retaliation cases involving the
Fair Labor Standards Act); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying “substantial or
motivating factor” test in First Amendment retaliation cases).
112. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347; see also Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1172 (2020).
113. See, e.g., Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 997 N.E.2d 597, 614 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)
(adopting Nassar’s standard); Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Flores, 555 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. App. 2018)
(citing Nassar in support of but-for standard).
114. See Johnson v. Friends of Weymouth, 461 S.E.2d 801, 804 (N.C. 1995); Huber v. Or. Dep’t of
Educ., 230 P.3d 937, 946 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Tenn.
2002); Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998); Martin v. Gonzaga Univ., 425
P.3d 837, 844 (Wash. 2018).
115. See Dey v. Scriptpro LLC, No. 95,375, 2006 WL 3589974, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2006)
(employing a motivating factor standard); Brandon v. Molesworth, 655 A.2d 1292, (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995), aff’d, rev’d in part, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996).
116. See Murcott v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Roach v.
Transwaste, Inc., HHDCV176074305S, 2020 WL 588934, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2020); Baiton
v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); First Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v.
Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Ky. 1993); Smith v. Tidewater Inc., 918 So.2d 1, 15 (La. Ct. App.
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“contributing factor” standard, 117 a “significant factor” standard, 118 a
proximate cause standard, 119 or some other similarly worded standard. 120
Thus, the default causation rule in federal employment discrimination
statutes is decidedly not the default causation rule in state tort law governing
the workplace. 121
One of the most noteworthy examples of the failure of state courts to
statutify tort law is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED). To establish an IIED claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
engaged in “extreme and outrageous” behavior. 122 This term has long defied
precise definition, 123 but there are several common indicators of extreme and
outrageous conduct. These include whether the defendant abused a position
of authority over the plaintiff, the motivation of the defendant, and whether
the conduct was repeated or prolonged. 124 On the statutory side, one way to
establish a claim of unlawful harassment under Title VII is to show that the
defendant’s discriminatory conduct was “severe or pervasive.” 125 In defining
the “severe or pervasive” concept, some courts have listed considerations that
2005); see also Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc., 953 P.2d 1089, 1095 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (approving a
“substantial or motivating factor” jury instruction); Syl. Pt. 3, McClung v. Marion Cty. Comm’n, 360
S.E.2d 221, 228 (W. Va. 1987) (adopting the “substantial or motivating factor” approach).
117. See Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
118. See Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 583 (Iowa 2017) (plurality).
119. See Holland v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 992 N.E.2d 43, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (approving
jury instruction on proximate cause and rejecting but-for standard); Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696,
700 (Va. 1998) (recognizing a proximate cause standard).
120. See Cardwell v. Am. Linen Supply, 843 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo. 1992) (requiring a showing that
retaliation “significantly motivated” the discharge). But see Peru Daily Tribune v. Shuler, 544 N.E.2d 560,
564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a but-for standard applies); Riesen v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 717
N.W.2d 907, 914 (Neb. 2006) (employing a but-for standard); Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
584 N.W.2d 296, 301–02 (Iowa 1998) (applying a “determinative factor” standard); Silberstein v. ProGolf of Am., Inc., 750 N.W.2d 615, 622–23 (Mich. 2008) (using the “determinative factor” standard). See
generally Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1995) (“[A] plaintiff must
prove that his refusal to perform an illegal act was the sole cause of his discharge before he can recover
damages from his former employer.”).
121. There are, of course, some states in which federal anti-discrimination statutes have directly
influenced the structure of common law retaliatory discharge claims. See Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling,
Inc., 93 P.3d 427, 433 (Alaska 2004) (applying an approach largely based on federal law). And it is worth
noting that earlier Supreme Court Title VII precedent influenced some courts as they attempted to define
the applicable causation standard in common law wrongful discharge cases. See Brandon v. Molesworth,
655 A.2d 1292, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (adopting the plurality approach from Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)), aff’d, rev’d in part, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996).
122. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM.
LAW INST. 2012).
123. See Russell Fraker, Reforming Outrage A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort IIED, 61
VAND. L. REV. 983, 994 (2008) (discussing the lack of clear standards).
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
125. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining that to violate Title VII,
harassing behavior must be “severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment”).
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are similar to those used in assessing whether conduct is extreme and
outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim. 126 So, for example, a supervisor
who repeatedly subjects an employee to racial slurs may have engaged in the
type of severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a Title VII
claim. 127
Given the fact that such behavior comes from one with authority over an
employee, is motivated by animus, and is repeated, there would seem to be a
good argument that such conduct would also naturally raise a jury question
as to whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous for purposes of an
IIED claim. 128 Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that to qualify as
“severe or pervasive” conduct, the conduct must be “extreme.” 129 This would
seem to strengthen the argument for connecting the two standards. Yet, there
are decisions in which courts hold as a matter of law that conduct was not
sufficiently extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim despite
amounting to severe or pervasive conduct under Title VII. 130 Likewise, there
are numerous decisions holding that sexual harassment that was actionable
under Title VII did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. 131 This
has been true regardless of whether the employees were subjected to severe
or pervasive harassment or to threats concerning future employment
prospects based on submission to a supervisor’s demand for sexual favors. 132

126. The Second Circuit has listed the following factors: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct, (2) its severity, (3) whether it is threatening and humiliating as opposed to a mere offensive
utterance, and (4) “whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Patane v.
Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). These factors are derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
127. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–87 (1998).
128. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 217 (1970) (holding plaintiff stated an IIED
claim for purposes of motion to dismiss where plaintiff was subjected to racist insults).
129. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786, 788.
130. See Jones v. James Constr. Grp., LLC, No. CV 08-534-RET-DLD, 2009 WL 10702632, at *5,
*5 n.8 (M.D. La. July 8, 2009) (stating that numerous courts have denied recovery for workplace IIED
disputes that do not involve “a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a sufficient period of time”
and citing cases in which the harassment occurred over the course of eight months or longer); Frank J.
Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Private Employment Sector, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 153–56 (2003) (noting difficulty plaintiffs have had in establishing IIED
cases in these situations, even when the conduct violates Title VII).
131. See Cavico, supra note 130, at 156 (“[T]he courts typically hold that sexual harassment, even
though violating Title VII, does not necessarily equate to a finding of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2127 (2007) (“[I]n most jurisdictions proof of discriminatory workplace
harassment—the kind of employment discrimination that looks most like a tort—is not sufficient to
guarantee tort recovery.”).
132. See Brewer v. Petroleum Suppliers, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 926, 932, 936 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (denying
summary judgment to employer on employee’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under Title VII but
stating that sexual “demands which, if refused, carry a consequence of economic loss or loss of status at
employment” are not sufficient to establish extreme and outrageous conduct); Ibraheem v. Wackenhut
Servs., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 196, 214–15 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
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Title VII harassment law has informed IIED law in at least one sense:
decisions under Title VII often establish a standard for what does not qualify
as extreme and outrageous conduct. It is black-letter law in many
jurisdictions that “mere” employment discrimination does not amount to
extreme and outrageous conduct for IIED purposes, 133 and it is well
established that unlawful harassment under Title VII, standing alone, does
not necessarily rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. 134 Instead,
some courts require that an IIED plaintiff establish that the defendant
engaged in sexual harassment and battery to meet the extreme and outrageous
conduct requirement. 135 Some courts have even suggested that harassing
conduct that is actionable under Title VII “occurs at a much lower threshold
of inappropriate conduct than the threshold required for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” 136 Therefore, conduct that does not amount
to actionable harassment under Title VII, by definition, does not amount to
extreme and outrageous conduct. 137
What is frequently lacking from these sorts of decisions is any
explanation of why any of this should be true. Title VII’s severe or pervasive

judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim but granting it with respect to plaintiff’s IIED
claim).
133. See Ibraheem, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (“Generally, ordinary workplace disputes, including the
discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment claims alleged here, do not rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to support a claim of IIED.”).
134. See Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., S.C., 841 F. Supp. 825, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that
allegations involving supervisor’s conduct were sufficient to establish a Title VII claim but not an IIED
claim); Land v. Midwest Office Tech., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1144 (D. Kan. 2000) (“The existence
of a hostile work environment sufficient to support a Title VII claim does not necessarily require a finding
of outrageous conduct.”); Cavico, supra note 130, at 153 (“[M]ost courts appear very reluctant to
automatically extend the tort cause of action to a discrimination case.”).
135. See Brewer, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (explaining that “when the sexual impositions are not merely
verbal or economic, but become physical impositions,” they amount to extreme and outrageous conduct);
Ibraheem, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 215 (“[F]ederal courts in New York routinely dismiss claims of IIED in the
employment context, with the only exception being where employment discrimination claims are
accompanied by allegations of both sexual harassment and battery.”).
136. Stingley v. State, 796 F. Supp. 424, 431 (D. Ariz. 1992); Coddington v. V.I. Port Auth , 911 F.
Supp. 907, 916 (D.V.I. 1996) (citing Stingley, 769 F. Supp. at 431); see also Piech, 841 F. Supp. at 831
(“A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, however, requires more than what is required for
sexual harassment.”); Galloway v. GA Tech. Auth., 182 F. App’x 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(concluding summary judgment on IIED claim was appropriate on the grounds that conduct was not
extreme and outrageous since the conduct did not amount to severe or pervasive harassment); Rawls v.
Garden City Hosp., No. 09-13924, 2012 WL 762616, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2012) (referring to the
“severe or pervasive” standard as being lower than the “extreme and outrageous” standard).
137. See Rice v. James, No. CV 117-039, 2019 WL 4132681, at *22 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2019) (stating
that failure to establish that conduct was extreme and outrageous precluded “a finding under the more
stringent” extreme and outrageous standard); Winston v. Bank of N. S., 2017 WL 970270, at *8 (D.V.I.
Mar. 13, 2017) (concluding that because plaintiff’s Title VII claim did not survive summary judgment,
defendant’s conduct did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct), aff’d, 722 F. App’x 138 (2018).
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standard is notoriously difficult to satisfy. 138 For example, some courts say
that for racial harassment to be actionable, the employee must be subject to a
“steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.” 139 This is no easy standard
to meet. Courts frequently refer to the “severe or pervasive” standard as a
“demanding” standard or a “high” bar or threshold. 140 Likewise, courts
routinely emphasize how demanding the “extreme and outrageous” standard
is. 141 The language courts use to describe what does not qualify as actionable
under either theory is also often interchangeable. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts famously explains that the concept of extreme and outrageous
conduct does not include “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities.” 142 These same kinds of terms regularly
appear in Title VII harassment decisions explaining what conduct does not
qualify as severe or pervasive harassment. 143 Numerous courts have stated
some variation on the theme that a “plaintiff’s status as an employee may
entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage by a
supervisor with authority over him than if he were a stranger.” 144 If that is the
case, why does the demanding standard of severe or pervasive harassment
under Title VII set a “much lower” 145 bar for actionable behavior than the
extreme and outrageous standard? If the defendant’s conduct creates a triable
138. See L. Camille Hebert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary
Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345, 1364 (2013) (noting the difficulty plaintiffs have had in meeting in this
standard).
139. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997); Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545,
551 (10th Cir. 1994).
140. Rester v. Stephens Media, LLC, 739 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2014); EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008); Mejia v. White Plains Self Storage Corp., No. 18-CV-12189
(KMK), 2020 WL 247995, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2020); Murray v. Dutchess Cty. Exec. Branch, No.
17-CV-9121 (KMK), 2019 WL 4688602, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2019); Kirkland v. McAleenan,
Civil Action No. 13-194 (RDM), 2019 WL 7067046, at *26 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2019); Steak N Shake Inc.
v. White, No. 4:18-cv-00072-SRC, 2020 WL 85172, at *15 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2020).
141. See, e.g., Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Ky. 2004) (stating the court
has set a “high threshold” for IIED and outrage claims) overruled on unrelated grounds by Toler v. SudChemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276 (Ky. 2014); Di Teresi v. Stamford Health Sys., Inc., 63 A.3d 1011, 1020
(Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (stating the standard establishes a “high bar for distasteful behavior”); McKee v.
McCann, 102 N.E.3d 38, 45 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (stating that it is “rare case that reaches the very high
bar of showing ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct”) (internal citation omitted).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
143. See Colman v. Faucher, 128 F. Supp. 3d 487, 500 (D.R.I. 2015) (stating that “petty indignities”
are insufficient to establish retaliation under Title VII); Richardson v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC,
No. 17 C 4046, 2018 WL 1811332, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2018) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
complained-of harassment “amount[s] to nothing more than mere inconveniences, petty slights and minor
annoyances”); Herman v. Coastal Corp., 791 A.2d 238, 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that
“mere insults” do not constitute discrimination).
144. White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (La. 1991); see also Robel v. Roundup Corp.,
59 P.3d 611, (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (pointing to the fact that the plaintiff was subjected to the conduct
from a supervisor in the workplace as a consideration in assessing the defendant’s conduct); Taylor v.
Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 695–96 (N.J. 1998) (citing the “power dynamics” of the workplace in concluding
that statement by one in a position of authority could be deemed extreme and outrageous).
145. Stingley v. State, 796 F. Supp. 424, 431 (D. Ariz. 1992).
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issue as to whether it meets the demanding “severe or pervasive” standard for
purposes of Title VII, why would this also not normally create a triable issue
as to whether the same conduct is extreme and outrageous?
There may be plausible answers to each of these questions. Part of the
explanation may be that courts do not apply either standard in a consistent
manner. 146 But this is perhaps all the more reason why courts might be
inclined to look to the other body of law for clarification. Professor Camille
Hebert has speculated about the possibility of conceptualizing harassment
that is actionable under Title VII as a dignitary tort involving the workplace,
in which unlawful harassment should also “regularly result in tort
liability.” 147 The similarities between these two theories of liability—severe
or pervasive harassment and extreme and outrageous conduct—are
obvious, 148 and it would be logical for the two theories to inform one another.
But rarely is there any attempt in the decisional law to harmonize these two
standards. And, in fact, courts seem to go to great lengths to keep the two
standards separate without offering any explanation or justification for this
approach.
The one glaring exception to this general tendency is a line of cases
originating from California intermediate appellate courts declaring that, “by
its very nature, sexual harassment in the workplace is outrageous conduct.” 149
Therefore, a plaintiff who properly pleads a statutory claim of unlawful
harassment under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
has, by definition, properly pled the extreme and outrageous requirement of
an IIED claim. 150 This stands as perhaps the clearest example of the
146. For example, while there are cases in which courts have held that conduct was actionable under
Title VII but not through the IIED tort, there have also been cases in which courts have allowed IIED
claims to proceed where the defendant’s conduct might be actionable under Title VII. See Edwards v.
Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1355 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (denying summary
judgment to defendant on Title VII sexual harassment and IIED claims); Brewer v. Petroleum Suppliers,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 926, 934, 936 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding the same); Hernandez v. Partners Warehouse
Supplier Servs., LLC, 890 F. Supp. 2d 951, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (concluding that plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged extreme and outrageous conduct based on defendant’s “repeated comments, sexual propositions
and unwelcome touching of” plaintiffs); Speight v. Albano Cleaners, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 560, 565 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (denying employer’s summary judgment motion where supervisor groped plaintiff on at least
two occasions).
147. Hebert, supra note 138, at 1347–48 (noting the difficulty plaintiffs have had in meeting in this
standard).
148. The Restatement (Third) of Torts actually notes the overlap between the theories. See id. at 1353
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. n (AM.
LAW INST. 2012)).
149. Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Other courts
have since cited Fisher for the same proposition. See Kelley v. Conco Cos., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 672
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011). In Kovatch v. California Casualty Management Co., a California appellate court
extended the rule to include harassment on the basis of sexual orientation. 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 231 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998).
150. See Wells v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-01700-SI, 2015 WL 6746820, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 5, 2015) (“Because Wells and Cordova have sufficiently alleged harassment claims under
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statutification of tort law governing the workplace. 151 But it remains the sole
example of this approach in the IIED context.
III. THE CASE FOR EXPANDING THE PRACTICE OF STATUTIFICATION
This Part examines why the statutification of workplace tort law has not
become a popular practice and suggests reasons why the practice should be
expanded. Questions of whether and to what extent courts should be willing
to look to statutes when dealing with analogous common law tort theories
depend heavily on the broader question of the proper role of tort law. At a
high level of generality, there are two main theories of tort law. 152 Under one
theory, tort law—traditionally classified as private law—is in reality a form
of public law, which advances public values and vindicates public wrongs. 153
Under the opposing view, tort law’s proper role is to do justice between the
parties at issue and it is poorly positioned to address broad social problems. 154
Judges who subscribe to this view of the role of tort law can logically be
expected to defer to legislatures that have dealt with the social problems at
issue rather than expanding or adapting tort law to deal with those
problems. 155 Through the lenses of these competing conceptions of tort law,
this Part explores the tendency of some courts either to ignore relevant
statutory law when dealing with an analogous tort issue involving the
workplace or to create a firewall between tort law and statutory law
governing the workplace.

FEHA, . . . [they] have sufficiently alleged the extreme and outrageous element for an IIED claim.”);
Bejarano v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 1:13–cv–01859–AWI–GSA, 2015 WL 351420, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23,
2015) (citing Fisher and denying defendant’s summary judgment motion on plaintiff’s IIED claim after
also denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on statutory harassment claim); Mayfield v.
Trevors Store, Inc., No. C–04–1483 MHP, 2004 WL 2806175, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) (stating that
plaintiff satisfied the pleading requirement with respect to IIED claim because plaintiff had properly pled
sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA). The converse may also be true: a plaintiff who fails to
properly plead sexual harassment as defined by statute has failed to properly plead extreme and outrageous
conduct in an IIED action absent some other conduct. See Sistena v. Genentech, Inc., No. A125555, 2010
WL 3179723, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2010) (holding that plaintiff “has not established a claim for
discrimination and absent a proper claim for discrimination, the comments made by Sistena’s supervisor
are not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress”).
151. At least one court has held that this line of cases is limited to sexual harassment and does not
automatically extend to other forms of harassment or retaliation. See Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp.,
No. C-92-2177-VRW, 1994 WL 675719, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1994) (“[T]he holding in Fisher is
limited to sexual harassment cases.”).
152. See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1992).
153. See Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 438 (2011) (describing
this conception of tort law).
154. See John C. P. Goldberg, Unloved Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1501,
1518–19 (2002) (“[T]ort law is not well-suited to solve the large-scale social and political problems it is
being asked to solve . . . .”).
155. See Rustad, supra note 153, at 476 (“[J]udges following civil recourse will be more likely to
defer to legislatures instead of finding creative continuity in tort law . . . .”).
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A. Possible Explanations for the Lack of Statutification of Tort Law
Governing the Workplace
There are several possible explanations for the failure of state courts to
look to federal statutory employment discrimination law when dealing with
related tort law issues. Some of these explanations are fairly mundane. For
example, in the case of the failure of the Supreme Court’s causation decisions
in the Title VII context to influence state tort law in related cases, state courts
may already have well-established tort-based causation standards in place
and are therefore uninterested in unsettling this law simply to bring it in line
with federal standards. 156 Another possible explanation is that courts view the
two areas of law as distinct to the point that it simply does not occur to them
that one might influence the other. In other words, some courts may view the
statutory approach to a particular problem as irrelevant to the question of how
tort law should deal with a related problem.
A more sophisticated version of this explanation would be that the two
bodies of law serve different purposes and incorporating statutory principles
into tort law would therefore be neither helpful nor appropriate. For example,
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes are designed specifically to
combat workplace discrimination and provide compensation to the victims
of such discrimination. In contrast, the tort of IIED is a dignitary tort,
designed to protect individual dignity and compensate an individual who has
been treated “in a way that does not respect that person’s intrinsic worth.” 157
One could argue that because the two bodies of law have fundamentally
different goals, linking the two or looking to one to help flesh out the contours
of the other would be inappropriate. This would perhaps help explain the
statements from some courts that, as a matter of law, the severe or pervasive
harassment that a plaintiff must establish to state a Title VII harassment claim
occurs at a lower threshold than the extreme and outrageous conduct
necessary to support an IIED claim. 158
For example, when initially deciding at what point harassment becomes
actionable under Title VII in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., one of the
options the Supreme Court could have chosen was whether the harassment
“seriously affected an employee’s psychological well-being” or led the
plaintiff to suffer injury, an approach already employed by some lower
courts. 159 Under this approach, the focus is squarely on harm to an individual
instead of harm to the goal of workplace equality. This approach would have
156. See generally Harper, supra note 14, at 1332–35 (noting that there are areas in which federal
law is unlikely to influence state common law because the common law may already be well established
and thus not open to future development or modification).
157. Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 104 CORNELL L.
REV. 317, 320 (2019); see also id. at 335 (listing IIED as a tort commonly identified as dignitary).
158. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
159. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
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put Title VII law very much in line with the IIED tort, which requires that
extreme and outrageous conduct results in emotional distress so severe that
no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. 160 But the Court
ultimately chose a standard that focused on the impact of the harassment on
the workplace instead of the plaintiff’s psychological well-being. 161 In
settling on this standard, the Court focused heavily on Title VII’s broad goal
of promoting workplace equality:
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will
detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.
Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality. 162

In contrast, the primary focus of the IIED tort is to compensate an
individual for the emotional harm stemming from conduct that diminishes
their dignity. 163 The tort certainly may deter outrageous behavior in the
workplace and elsewhere, 164 but its principal purpose is to provide a remedy
for the severe emotional distress caused by extreme and outrageous conduct,
not to promote workplace equality. Because it is difficult to classify Title VII
as a statutory dignitary tort and the IIED tort as an anti-discrimination tort, 165
judges may believe that looking to Title VII to define the concept of extreme
and outrageous conduct in an IIED case involving a similar fact pattern would
be of limited value.
Some courts have alluded to another possible explanation for the lack of
statutification in this area. This explanation focuses less on the different
purposes of the two areas of law; instead, it is grounded in courts’ views of
the importance of preserving both the discretion traditionally afforded to
employers under the at-will rule and the prerogative of the legislature to
regulate employers in this area. In retaliatory or wrongful discharge cases,
for example, courts often emphasize that the tort theory is a “limited” 166 or
160.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
162. Id.
163. The IIED tort is grouped under the chapter in the Restatement addressing liability for emotional
harm. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 8 (AM. LAW
INST. 2012).
164. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1268, 1288–89 (1996) (discussing the deterrent effect of the IIED tort in employment and
commercial settings).
165. See generally Hebert, supra note 138, at 1363–68 (discussing the disadvantages of treating
sexual harassment as a dignitary tort).
166. See, e.g., Chism v. Mid-S. Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn. 1988); Hansen v.
Harrah’s, 675 P.2d 394, 396 (Nev. 1984).
161.
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“narrow” 167 exception to the at-will rule—particularly when courts are
justifying their refusal to extend the theory to a particular factual scenario. 168
Courts express the concern that by expanding the tort, they may “impair the
exercise of managerial discretion or . . . foment unwarranted litigation.” 169
Closely related to this rationale is concern over intruding upon the legislative
domain. 170 State legislatures have chosen to place limits on the unfettered
ability of employers to fire their employees in some instances but not in
others. For example, a legislature may enact a statute providing an employee
with a remedy when an employer has retaliated against the employee for
filing a workers’ compensation claim but not when an employee engages in
whistleblowing activities (or vice versa). In such situations, a state court may
have to decide whether to afford a common law remedy in the face of a
statute that already provides a remedy in the one instance or to take the failure
of the legislature to act in the other instance as a sign that the legislature has
deliberately chosen not to act. 171 Under either scenario, a court is making a
decision as to how best to respect a legislature’s role as the primary
policymaking branch of government. 172 And in most instances where state
courts have not looked to federal statutory law when considering related tort
cases, the outcome has been to narrow, rather than expand, potential
employer liability.
These themes play out in the IIED, retaliatory discharge, and retaliatory
discipline cases, albeit with little more than passing reference to the federal
statutory law on point. In IIED cases involving the workplace, state courts
regularly explain that such claims are disfavored due to the fear of intruding
upon managerial discretion. 173 Courts express the same concern in retaliatory
discipline cases, and sometimes also reference the concern over altering the
167. See, e.g., Martin v. Gonzaga Univ., 425 P.3d 837, 842 (Wash. 2018); Bereston v. UHS of Del.,
Inc., 180 A.3d 95, 111 (D.C. 2018).
168. See, e.g., Shovelin v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 850 P.2d 996, 1010-11 (N.M. 1993).
169. Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387–88 (Conn. 1980); see also Pang v.
Int’l Document Servs., 356 P 3d 1190, 1197 (Utah 2015) (“[B]y cabining the scope of the public policy
exception, we ‘avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in discharging employees.’”) (quoting
Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998)); Jones v. Univ. of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d
127, 144 (Iowa 2013) (noting that the wrongful discharge tort limits employer discretion).
170. See Stevenson v. Superior Ct., 941 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Cal. 1997) (“[T]ethering public policy to
specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves . . . to avoid judicial interference with the legislative
domain.”).
171. See Carter v. District of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1226 (D.C. 2009) (declining, out of
deference to the legislature’s prerogatives, to recognize new exception to at-will rule in the face of existing
statute on the same subject).
172. See generally Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 763 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he public-policy
exception to the employment at-will doctrine is a product of the balancing by our legislature of the
competing interests of the employer, employee, and society.”).
173. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co , 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting the need
of employers to “review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees” and stating that only in the
most unusual case is an IIED claim based on such conduct actionable).
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balance between the interests of employers and employees struck by an
existing statute. 174
B. Competing Conceptions of the Role of Tort Law in the Workplace
These concerns over the proper role of tort law in the workplace take
place against the backdrop of competing visions of the role of tort law more
generally. However, disagreements concerning the proper role of tort law are
amplified in the workplace context, given the ongoing tension between
increased statutory regulation of the workplace and the longstanding
employment-at-will rule. As legislation has gradually chipped away at the
discretion traditionally afforded to employers under the at-will rule, courts
have struggled more frequently with the question of how best to strike the
balance between limiting harmful employer conduct and preventing the
judiciary from getting drawn into the minutiae of the workplace and acting
as “super personnel departments.” 175 This tension manifests not just in the
interpretation of statutes regulating the workplace, but also in the
interpretation and application of the corresponding tort law. Thus, how a
judge views the role of tort law is likely to influence how that judge strikes
this balance.
One conception of tort law focuses heavily on deterrence and views tort
law as a vehicle for addressing societal problems. 176 A judge who views tort
law through this lens would perhaps be more likely to look to statutes to
divine public policy that a cause of action sounding in tort could vindicate.
In contrast, those who adopt a corrective justice view see tort law as
decidedly private law. 177 Under this view, tort law’s role is to rectify losses
caused by a defendant’s conduct and to restore equilibrium between the
parties, not to further broad public policies. 178 A judge who subscribes to this
view is more likely to believe that tort law runs the greatest risk of illegitimate
judicial legislating when it focuses on deterring wrongful conduct rather than

See infra notes 290–293 and accompanying text.
Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 722 (8th Cir. 2011).
176. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (describing the deterrence-based approach to torts).
177. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 697 (2003)
(“Corrective justice theory views tort law as a matter of ‘private law’ in an important sense . . . .”).
178. See id. at 695 (explaining that corrective justice aims to restore the normative equilibrium
between private parties); Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 197 (2000) (explaining that corrective justice is concerned with
rectifying wrongdoing). Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky has distinguished corrective justice from what
he calls the “civil recourse” theory. Zipursky, supra note 177, at 739. Corrective justice is based upon the
notion of a “freestanding duty of repair” that may or may be implicated by the filing of a lawsuit. Id. Civil
recourse is instead grounded upon the idea that a plaintiff’s right is “correlative to an obligation in the
state to privilege and empower persons to act against those who have wronged them.” Id.
174.
175.
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remedying individual harm. 179 Therefore, a judge who views tort law through
this lens would logically be less likely to look to statutory commands in order
to help define the contours of a tort, even if the two areas of law happen to
focus on the same issues in a given case.
This split in approaches is, of course, representative of broader splits
concerning the proper role of judges in the common law tradition, particularly
when dealing with statutes. 180 Judges who are generally willing to develop
new common law approaches to deal with changing societal concerns might
naturally be more inclined to look to statutory law for clues as to the proper
policy approach. 181 Judges who base their identity around the idea that the
legislature’s view is paramount when it comes to the development of public
policy may be less inclined to view tort law as the appropriate vehicle to
address broader societal concerns. 182 But the fact that tort law and statutory
law increasingly coexist in an uncomfortable manner within the workplace
only heightens the intensity of the split.
Perhaps the clearest example of how these competing views of tort law
may produce different approaches to tort issues involving the workplace is
the tort of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy. The tort of
retaliatory (or wrongful) discharge in violation of public policy is recognized
in nearly every jurisdiction. 183 As its name implies, the tort provides a remedy
to individuals who have been discharged when the discharge contravenes a
clear or well-established public policy. 184 Examples include when an
employee is fired for (1) refusing to commit what the employee reasonably
believes is unlawful conduct, (2) fulfilling an important public obligation
(such as jury duty), (3) exercising a statutory or similar right (such as filing
for workers’ compensation benefits), and (4) whistleblowing. 185 In deciding
179. See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 536 (2003)
(discussing concerns over judicial activism).
180. See generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA.
L. REV. 1357, 1362–63 (2015) (noting the different judicial approaches on the issue of the relationship
between statutory and common law).
181. See generally Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1995) (discussing the judicial approach to
tort law in a time of increased statutory regulation).
182. See generally Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts the Common Law, 8
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 299, 300–02 (2004) (explaining that “it is the legislature that serves as the People’s
lawgiver in matters of public policy,” and that the common law presents an embarrassment to traditionalist
judges who take this position).
183. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 2015); id. Reporters’ Notes cmt.
a (“Almost all jurisdictions recognize some form of the cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy.”).
184. See id. § 5.01 (describing the tort); Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contractors, Inc., 551
N.E.2d 981, 981 (Ohio 1990) (recognizing the tort), overruled in part by Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic
Corp., 584 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 1992).
185. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (listing these exceptions to the
at-will rule, among others); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (jury duty); Frampton v. Cent.
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whether a clear or well-established public policy exists and is jeopardized by
a firing, courts regularly look to statutes in order to discern the existence of
such a policy. Thus, this tort is premised on the need for a court to look to
another body of law to determine whether a cause of action should be
recognized. 186
A judge who views tort law as public law or through the lens of
deterrence is likely to view the retaliatory discharge tort as a means of
protecting the societal interests at stake. The employment-at-will rule gives
employers the authority to unfairly or “wrongfully” fire an employee. But it
is only where the firing threatens public interests that the law intervenes.
Therefore, for some courts, the focus of the tort is primarily about vindicating
public policy and secondarily about providing a remedy to the discharged
employee. 187 Under this approach, an employee who loses a job as a result of
engaging in activity that society wants to encourage (voting, for instance) has
certainly suffered a wrong at the hands of an employer. The same is true for
an employee who is fired after taking advantage of a statutory process
designed to deal with competing policy concerns (filing for workers’
compensation benefits, for instance) or for reporting or refusing to engage in
illegal conduct. But the raison d’etre of the retaliatory discharge tort is to
prevent employers from jeopardizing the public policy that underlies the
employee’s actions. 188 Thus, some courts speak of the retaliatory discharge
tort in terms of balancing the interests of the employer, the employee, and
the public. 189 The requirement that a plaintiff be able to point to a clear
expression of public policy in a statute or some other positive law serves
primarily to ensure that the public’s interests are being protected by affording
the plaintiff a remedy. While statutes are the most obvious place to turn in
order to divine public policy, a judge that views tort law in this light might
logically be expected to view tort rules themselves as articulating substantial
public policy and thus serving as the source of public policy the tort seeks to
protect. 190

Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (workers’ compensation claim); Murcott v. Best W. Int’l,
Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1095–96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (internal and external whistleblowing).
186. See Nancy Modesitt, Wrongful Discharge The Use of Federal Law as a Source of Public Policy,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 623, 625–26 (2006) (discussing the different sources of public policy to which
courts look).
187. See generally David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 69 HASTINGS L.J.
1225, 1244–45 (2018) (discussing how providing protection to whistleblowers primarily serves public
interests).
188. See Smith v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., No. 85 C 5795, 1986 WL 6910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1986)
(referring to vindication of a violation of public policy as the raison d’etre of the tort).
189. See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins. 824 P.2d 680, 687–88 (Cal. 1992), overruled by Green v. Ralee
Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998); Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
190. See, e.g., Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718–19 (W. Va. 2001) (recognizing the
common law as a potential source of public policy).
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For judges who view tort law through the corrective justice lens, the
retaliatory discharge tort is at odds with their worldview. Rather than
focusing on doing justice between employer and employee, the tort forces
judges to focus on deterring employers from engaging in conduct that
threatens broader societal goals. Therefore, a judge who takes a corrective
justice view of tort law might naturally be inclined to try to limit the reach of
the tort. Not surprisingly, many decisions define the retaliatory discharge tort
largely in terms of remedying the harm an employee suffers when the
employee is fired after being presented with a Hobson’s choice by the
employer, rather than in terms of the public’s interest in the outcome of the
choice. 191 Judges who view tort law in this manner may have no choice but
to look to statutes in determining whether a clear public policy exists, but
they might be expected to limit their search for a clearly articulated public
policy to statutes that contain clear expressions regarding employer conduct
as opposed to hortatory language concerning societal goals. 192 Given their
view of tort law primarily as a means of restoring equilibrium between
parties, these judges might also be unwilling to recognize common law tort
rules as broader expressions of public policy for the purposes of retaliatory
discharge claims. 193 In the absence of legislation clearly defining an
employer’s actions toward an employee as injurious, judges in this camp
might also demonstrate a particular sensitivity to the rights traditionally
afforded employers by courts and legislatures. Thus, they might be unwilling
to permit a retaliatory discharge claim to proceed where the public policy can
be vindicated through some other means that does not impinge upon the atwill rule. 194

191. See Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 699 F. Supp. 1283, 1297
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (referring to “affording relief to otherwise remediless plaintiffs” as the raison d’etre of
the tort). When explaining the need for a balancing of interests, courts following this approach tend to
exclude any mention of the public’s interest. See, e.g., Antinerella v. Rioux, 642 A.2d 699, 705 (Conn.
1994).
192. Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky has analogized judges who take a corrective justice approach
to tort law to those who take a textualist approach to statutory interpretation insofar as they perceive
themselves as constrained in their roles. Zipursky, supra note 177, at 732.
193. Some courts require that the relevant public policy may only be expressed through a statute,
constitutional provision, or administrative regulation. See, e.g., Luethans v. Wash. Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169,
171 n.2 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
194. For example, the Washington Supreme Court held in Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc. that to prevail on
a retaliatory discharge claim, an employee must demonstrate that “other means of promoting the public
policy are inadequate, and that the actions the plaintiff took were the ‘only available adequate means’ to
promote the public policy.” 259 P.3d 244, 247 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). Several
years later, the court overruled this holding but still required that a court consider whether any statutory
remedy created was intended to be the exclusive remedy. Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 358 P.3d
1139, 1146 (Wash. 2015).
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C. The Arguments for Some Statutification of the Tort
Law Involving the Workplace
Other authors, most notably Professor Martha Chamallas, have
suggested that tort law could play a more robust role in the regulation of the
workplace, particularly in addressing workplace discrimination. 195
Ultimately, these arguments run up against the reality that many judges view
the role of tort law as limited. This is particularly true of tort law touching on
the workplace, given the discretion the law has traditionally afforded to
employers. The remainder of this Article serves as a gentle reminder to judges
of all stripes that tort law and statutory law are now both so heavily involved
in the regulation of the workplace that it is difficult to do one’s job as a judge
without at least considering how the two bodies of law might inform one
another.
It is increasingly rare that an issue concerning employee rights involves
only tort law or only statutory law. Even the most devoted proponents of a
corrective justice view of tort law recognize that the statutory law concerning
the workplace—with all of its attendant policy-based and deterrence
concerns—shares the field with modern tort law involving the workplace.
Likewise, the proponents of this approach undoubtedly recognize that the tort
of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, however limited it may
be, now forces state courts to consider the interests of the public in the
resolution of tort-based claims. Proponents of a deterrence-based approach
to tort law that vindicates public interests also undoubtedly realize that some
consideration of statutory measures is inevitable because tort law does not
develop on a blank canvas when it comes to regulation of the workplace. One
does not necessarily have to choose a side in the debate over the proper
function of tort law to conclude, from a purely pragmatic standpoint, that
statutory law governing the workplace can offer useful insight to a court as it
assesses a related tort law question.
Some amount of back and forth between the two areas of law is
inevitable. As Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes began limiting
the traditional freedoms afforded to employers, tort law soon followed suit. 196
Naturally, state court judges began confronting similar interpretive issues and
questions as to when tort law should fill gaps left by statutes and when the
act of filling those gaps might intrude upon legislative prerogatives. These
courts were required to develop the common law in the shadow of federal
statutory law. Therefore, statutory law has had at least an indirect influence
on the development of tort law in the employment context, even if state courts
195.

MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER,

AND TORT LAW 85 (2010).

196. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837–38 (Wis. 1983) (citing Title VII
and other statutory modifications to the at-will rule in support of recognizing the retaliatory discharge
tort).
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have been reluctant to directly import its principles. And as discussed above,
tort law has clearly influenced the development of statutory antidiscrimination law. 197
This type of back and forth is completely appropriate in the abstract.
Unless one believes that a practice of willful blindness is a proper approach
to judging, it would seem appropriate to at least look to this other body of
law to see what lessons, if any, it might offer. The question is to what extent
is it appropriate to look to another area of law for guidance and what
influence that other area of law should have. State courts do not necessarily
have to articulate a lockstep approach in which tort law involving the
workplace tracks the analogous statutory law in a given situation, as
California appellate courts have done with respect to IIED claims. 198 Instead,
under either of the two dominant views of tort law, judges can appropriately
look to statutory law in attempting to define the contours of the common law
involving the workplace and vice versa.
Of course, one of the chief criticisms of the tortification phenomenon is
that the borrowing of tort law principles for use in anti-discrimination statutes
is often inappropriate or, at a minimum, produces awkward results. 199 Indeed,
it may not always make sense to borrow substance from another body of law,
and sometimes other bodies of law have little to offer on the particular point
at all. Professor Deborah Brake has generally been critical of federal courts
importing substantive tort rules into the interpretation and application of
federal anti-discrimination statutes. 200 Nonetheless, she acknowledges that
there may be instances in which the other body of law may provide useful
guidance. For example, Brake argues that “tort law might be mined” in some
instances for principles that could help guide Title VII retaliation law in a
more logical direction. 201 Importantly, Brake does not necessarily
recommend importing black-letter tort rules for use in the statutory
discrimination context. Instead, Brake suggests courts could look to tort law’s
traditional focus on defendant fault “to direct attention to employer fault and
strengthen” employee protections. 202
As another example, Brake suggests that tort law’s focus on
wrongfulness might help define the scope of protected activity for purposes
of a Title VII retaliation claim and explain why taking retaliatory action
against an employee should be deemed wrongful. 203 Brake cites the situation
See supra notes 19–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 66–84 and accompanying text.
200. Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying Retaliation Protected Activity at the Intersection of Fault, Duty,
and Causation, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1397–99 (2014).
201. Id. at 1402.
202. Id. at 1407.
203. Id. at 1404.
197.
198.
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in which an employer encourages employees to take advantage of internal
processes to address unlawful discrimination and then takes action against
the employee who does so. 204 The Supreme Court’s Title VII precedent
strongly incentivizes employers to develop such internal processes by
affording them an affirmative defense to claims involving supervisor
harassment where the employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct such harassment. 205 At the same time, Title VII retaliation
law also removes an employee’s protection from retaliation for having taken
advantage of such a process if the employee lacks a “reasonable belief” that
the conduct complained of was unlawful. 206 Courts have somewhat famously
held non-lawyer employees to a demanding standard in terms of what
qualifies as a reasonable belief. 207 Brake notes that retaliation against an
employee who utilizes an employer-provided process could easily be
classified as “wrongful” from a corrective justice viewpoint. Not only does
such retaliation interfere with an employee’s work life, but it also allows the
employer “to have its cake and eat it too.” 208 The employer receives the
benefits of engendering employee trust and being able to utilize the
affirmative defense, but it is still able to harm a “disloyal” employee who
supposedly lacks a reasonable belief as to whether unlawful discrimination
has occurred. 209 By looking to tort law’s focus on the wrongfulness of a
defendant’s conduct, courts may similarly be more inclined to focus on the
wrongfulness of the employer’s conduct when assessing a statutory
retaliation claim. 210
Of course, it may be that a state court looks to decisions interpreting and
applying an employment statute and finds little of persuasive value. For
example, a court might find Title VII harassment cases to shed little light on
the meaning of “extreme and outrageous” conduct for purposes of an IIED
claim, given the different goals of these two theories of liability. 211 Similarly,
a court might take note of the Supreme Court’s Title VII decisions involving
causation and conclude that there is no particularly compelling reason to
upset long-settled tort law by adopting the approach to issues of causation
that federal courts have adopted in interpreting discrimination statutes. 212
Id. at 1405.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
206. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
207. See Matthew W. Green Jr., What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness? Rejecting a Case
Law-Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 759, 794 (2014)
(discussing the demanding standard to which courts often hold retaliation plaintiffs).
208. Brake, supra note 200, at 1405.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 1407–11.
211. See supra notes 156–165 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 47–63 and accompanying text.
204.
205.
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Nonetheless, considering principles imported from other bodies of law could
lead to stronger analysis and could, consistent with the common law tradition,
guide future courts wrestling with the same issues. For example, rather than
blithely continuing to assert that Title VII’s “severe or pervasive” standard
establishes a much lower threshold than IIED’s “extreme and outrageous”
standard, 213 courts could actually consider why this should be the case.
Regardless of their conclusions, such consideration might enable courts to
flesh out the meaning of both standards in a way that provides clearer
guidance for future litigants.
IV. THE SPECIAL CASE OF RETALIATION AND THE TORT OF RETALIATORY
DISCIPLINE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
By engaging in the inquiry described in this Article, state courts may
develop better-reasoned and more robust tort rules for use in the workplace
even if they choose not to import rules from statutory law. But sometimes
courts may find that rules developed in the statutory context have a place
within the common law tort regime. One example of how statutory principles
should inform the development of tort law governing the workplace is the
tort of retaliatory discipline (as opposed to discharge) in violation of public
policy. This Part explores the general failure of state courts to look to federal
retaliation law when deciding whether to recognize the tort of retaliatory
discipline and suggests that this is a situation in which courts should engage
in statutification.
A. Statutory Protection from Retaliation in Federal
Anti-discrimination Statutes
The ability of Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes to combat
discrimination depends in large part on the willingness of employees to come
forward when they are subject to or observe discrimination. 214 As a result,
Title VII contains an anti-retaliation provision in addition to its prohibition
on discrimination. Title VII contains two distinct prohibitions on employer
retaliation. First, section 704(a) contains an “opposition clause,” which
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because the
employee has opposed an employment practice that is unlawful under Title
VII. 215 Second, this section also contains a “participation clause,” which
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because the

See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
See Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005) (stating that the effectiveness
of discrimination law “turns on people’s ability to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of
retaliation”).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018).
213.
214.
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employee “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 216
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
establish that they engaged in one of these two forms of protected activity. In
addition, the plaintiff must show that there was a causal connection between
the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct and that the retaliatory
conduct was actionable. 217 This same framework applies to claims brought
pursuant to other federal anti-discrimination statutes, such as the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). 218
B. The Material Adversity Standard
1. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White and the Material
Adversity Standard
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
show that the employer’s allegedly retaliatory action was actionable to begin
with. For years, courts were split as to the standard for determining when
employer retaliation was actionable under Title VII. Some courts took the
position that the standards for actionable discrimination and retaliation were
the same, so that employer retaliation must have been significant enough to
result in a material change to the terms and conditions of employment. 219
Others required that the retaliation resulted in an “ultimate employment
decision,” such as discharge. 220 In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
v. White, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the discrimination
and retaliation standards were coterminous, holding that employer retaliation
need only be “materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant”
in order to be actionable. 221 An action is materially adverse if it “could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” 222
The Court’s decision was based on both the plain language of section
704(a) and the purposes that underly anti-retaliation provisions more
generally. Unlike Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision, which speaks of
discrimination impacting “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

216.

Id.
See Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing the showing required
to make out a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII).
218. See id. (noting that the same framework applies to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981);
Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 544 (10th Cir. 2014) (describing the framework that
governs ADA retaliation claims).
219. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) (citing cases).
220. See id. (citing cases).
221. Id. at 57.
222. Id.
217.
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employment,” 223 the anti-retaliation provision contains no such limitations. 224
In addition, the Court noted that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
advances the statute’s anti-discrimination mandate “by preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to
secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.” 225 Because the
anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employers from interfering with
employees’ “‘unfettered access’ to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms,” the
Court settled on a standard that focused on the deterrent effect retaliation was
likely to have an employee: whether a reasonable employee would have
found the retaliation to be materially adverse. 226
In fleshing out the meaning of its material adversity standard, the Court
emphasized that the standard excluded “trivial harms,” “simple lack of good
manners,” and “those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place
at work and that all employees experience.” 227 But the Court was also careful
to emphasize that “[c]ontext matters.” 228 As the Court explained, “[a]
schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference
to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with schoolage children.” 229 Likewise, excluding an employee from a lunch invitation
might ordinarily be a petty slight, but excluding that same employee from a
weekly training lunch that might advance the employee’s career could
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. 230
In Burlington Northern, the employer retaliated against an employee
who had registered an internal complaint concerning her supervisor’s sexist
behavior by reassigning the employee from forklift duty to a track laborer
job. 231 The track laborer and forklift positions were in the same category, but
the track laborer job was generally considered to be more arduous and less
prestigious. 232 Applying the material adversity standard to these facts, the
Court observed that a reassignment of job duties might not be actionable in
some instances, but that “one good way to discourage an employee . . . from
bringing discrimination charges would be to insist that she spend more time
performing the more arduous duties and less time performing those that are
easier or more agreeable.” 233 Judged from the perspective of a reasonable
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a) (2018).
See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 62–63 (discussing differences in statutory language).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 68 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 70–71.
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person in the employee’s position, the Court held that reassignment of job
duties in Burlington Northern could be materially adverse. 234
2. The Battle Over the Meaning of the Material Adversity Standard
On its face, the material adversity standard represents a substantial
victory for employees. 235 Because employees need not establish that they
suffered an ultimate employment action before bringing a retaliation claim
under the material adversity standard, the Burlington Northern decision
potentially makes numerous forms of employer retaliation actionable,
including written reprimands and warnings, 236 threats of discharge, 237
schedule changes, 238 placing an employee on disciplinary or administrative
leave, 239 physically isolating an employee from coworkers, 240 and instructing
subordinates to shun an employee who engages in protected activity. 241 The
decision is also significant because lower courts have adopted the standard
for use in a host of other federal statutes that prohibit employment retaliation,
such as the ADA, the FMLA, and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 242
Many of the managerial decisions that are now subject to challenge as
unlawful retaliation are also decisions that courts, citing the employment-atwill rule, have traditionally protected from judicial oversight. In many of
these instances, a plaintiff will not have experienced tangible economic harm
as a result of the employer’s actions. 243 So, perhaps it is not surprising that
Id. at 71.
See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Timing Isn’t Everything Establishing a Title VII Retaliation Prima
Facie Case After University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 69 SMU L. REV. 143, 151
(2016) (stating the Court took a “relatively pro-employee” approach).
236. See Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2011).
237. See Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009).
238. See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2036,
2036 n.18 (2015) (listing cases); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Disabling ADA Retaliation Claims, 19 NEV.
L.J. 823, 831–32, 832 n.59 (2019) (same).
239. See McKneely v. Zachary Police Dep’t, No. CIV.A. 12-354-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL 4585160, at
*10–11 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2013).
240. See Olonovich v. FMR-LLC Fid. Invs., No. CV 15-599 SCY/WPL, 2016 WL 9777193, at *7
(D.N.M. June 21, 2016).
241. See id.
242. See Adams v. Anne Arundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 431 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying
material adversity standard to retaliation claims involving the ADA); Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d
1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying material adversity standard to ADEA retaliation claim); Freelain
v. Village of Oak Park, 888 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying material adversity standard to
retaliation claims involving FMLA); Tooker v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 522 S.W.3d 545, 562–63 (Tex.
App. 2017) (applying material adversity standard to retaliation claims involving FLSA).
243. In briefs filed with the Court in Burlington Northern, employers emphasized this fact. See Reply
Brief of Petitioner at 8, Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259), 2006
WL 937535, at *8 (“Most significantly, decisions at the very core of daily supervisory responsibility such as where employees will work, when lunch breaks will be taken, and which employee will do what
tasks - will always be actionable under White’s theory even though they cause no economic harm and are
neither severe nor pervasive.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Association of American Railroads in Support
234.
235.
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some courts have been reluctant to extend the Burlington Northern holding
to its intended reach. 244 In applying Burlington Northern, some courts
emphasize the portion of the opinion stating that the material adversity
standard does not include “trivial harms” and “minor annoyances,” while
giving short shrift to the actual holding that retaliation is actionable when it
might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. These courts tend to issue broad holdings that come close to
announcing bright-line rules that particular forms of retaliatory conduct are
categorically not actionable. 245 For example, in Burlington Northern, the
Court made clear that actionable retaliation may include actions that do not
result in loss of employment or compensation, citing the example of a
schedule change in the case of a parent with school-age children. 246 Despite
this, some courts appear to have come precariously close to adopting a brightline rule that a schedule change that has no effect on compensation or total
hours worked is, as a matter of law, not materially adverse. 247

of Petitioner Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. at 8–9, Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 219564, at *8–9 (arguing that federal law requires an injury
in the form of tangible harm before federal anti-discrimination law provides a remedy).
244. See Alex B. Long, Retaliation Backlash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 757–58 (2018) (discussing the
strict approach some courts take on the issue of material adversity in terms of judicial reluctance to
interfere with managerial discretion).
245. See Sperino, supra note 238, at 2035 (“When judges write opinions advocating a high harm
threshold, they often issue broad opinions that appear to hold, as a matter of law, that a particular action
is never serious enough to create liability.”); see also Wilkins v. Sessions, No. CV 8:17-403-TMC-KDW,
2018 WL 3131027, at *13 (D.S.C. June 8, 2018) (observing that plaintiff did not establish that shift change
resulted in loss of pay or chances for promotion and that an “[e]mployer’s decisions about schedule
changes do not typically establish materially adverse actions”); Emami v. Bolden, 241 F. Supp. 3d 673,
685 (E.D. Va. 2017) (stating that a negative performance review, standing alone, does not constitute a
materially adverse action); Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he mere
threat of termination does not constitute an adverse employment action.”); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 452 F.
App’x 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that “[n]either extreme supervision and snubbing, nor increased
criticism, will satisfy” the material adversity standard); Butler v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 473,
496 (M.D. La. 2012) (stating that supervisor chastisement does not rise to the level of material adversity).
246. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
247. See Lushute v. La., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 479 F. App’x 553, 555 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that
shift change from four days a week to five days a week with no change in compensation or total hours
worked was not materially adverse); Rodriguez v. Webb Hosp. Corp., 234 F. Supp. 3d 834, 841 (S.D.
Tex. 2017) (stating that a shift change without an increase in weekly work hours “is not a materially
adverse employment action”); Schilling v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., No. CIV.A. 12-00661-SDD-SCR,
2014 WL 3721959, at *18 (M.D. La. July 18, 2014) (stating that plaintiff failed to introduce evidence that
her shift change resulted in a change in compensation or total hours worked, “[h]ence . . . this change in
schedule did not amount to an adverse employment action”); see also Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605
F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that scheduling change resulting in employee getting Sundays and
Mondays off instead of Saturdays and Sundays off was not materially adverse absent a showing of “undue
hardship” caused by the change); Wilkins v. Sessions, No. CV 8:17-403-TMC-KDW, 2018 WL 3131027,
at *13 (D.S.C. June 8, 2018) (observing that plaintiff did not establish that shift change resulted in loss of
pay or chances for promotion and that an “[e]mployer’s decisions about schedule changes do not typically
establish materially adverse actions”).
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In contrast, other courts apply the Burlington Northern standard the way
it was meant to be applied, with reference to the need for context-specific
consideration. 248 In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court noted the need
for “broad protection from retaliation” in order to further the goals of Title
VII. 249 Some courts have emphasized this language in their decisions and
noted that the anti-retaliation provision “forbids a wide range of employer
action.” 250 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that the Burlington Northern
decision “strongly suggests that it is for a jury to decide whether anything
more than the most petty and trivial actions should be considered ‘materially
adverse,’” 251 a theme picked up by several other courts. 252 Other courts have
likewise stated that the question of whether a challenged action is materially
adverse is generally a question of fact for the jury. 253 In short, early Supreme
Court retaliation decisions caused many courts to reevaluate their past
approaches and at least some to acknowledge the important role that fear of
retaliation has on the willingness of employees to come forward in the face
of possibly unlawful discrimination. 254

248. See Tolar v. Marion Bank & Tr., Co., 378 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1123 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (“[T]he
significance of a retaliatory act depends on the context of the act, and a specific action may be materially
adverse in some situations but immaterial in others.”) (internal citation omitted); Harris v. Fla. Agency for
Health Care Admin., 611 F. App’x 949, 952 (11th Cir. 2015) (adopting the same rule); see, e.g., Hallmon
v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (D. Colo. 2013) (stating that repeated threats to
issue a written warning, even if not acted upon, may qualify as materially adverse); Moore v. KUKA
Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that instructing the other
employees “not to talk to [plaintiff], go into his area or otherwise interact with him” constituted actionable
retaliation).
249. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
250. Lin v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. CIV.A. 11–3158, 2015 WL 273035, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20,
2015); see also Tolar, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (noting the Supreme Court’s observation about the need
for broad protection against retaliation).
251. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 n.13 (11th Cir. 2008).
252. Briscella v. Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., No. 16-614, 2018 WL 6413305, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4,
2018); Estate of Olivia v. New Jersey, 589 F. Supp. 2d 539, 543 n.7 (D.N.J. 2008).
253. See McArdle v. Dell Prods., L.P., 293 F. App’x 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Whether a reasonable
employee would view the challenged action as materially adverse involves questions of fact generally left
for a jury to decide.”); Boyd v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 349 P.3d 864, 870 (Wash. Ct. App.
2015) (“[W]hether a particular action would be viewed as adverse by a reasonable employee is a question
of fact appropriate for a jury.”).
254. See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that
an earlier decision was inconsistent with a subsequent Supreme Court decision and noting that “fear of
retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and
discrimination”) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271,
279 (2009)).
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C. The Tort of Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
States have their own statutes prohibiting employment retaliation, many
of which track federal statutes. 255 But states have also developed common
law theories that may provide compensation for the victims of workplace
retaliation while also addressing the societal harms caused by such
retaliation. As discussed above, the tort of retaliatory discharge in violation
of public policy is a tort-based exception to the employment-at-will rule that
seeks to strike a balance “between an employer’s interests in efficiently and
profitably operating a business, society’s interest in assuring its public
policies are followed, and an employee’s interest in earning a livelihood.” 256
The history of retaliatory discharge as a tort demonstrates the
complexities that arise when tort and statutory law cover similar disputes.
The retaliatory discharge tort rose to prominence in the 1980s at a time when
lawyers for employees were trying to devise new ways around the traditional
employment-at-will rule. 257 In some instances, a retaliatory discharge claim
may overlap with anti-discrimination statutes and thus serve as a supplement
or alternative to a more traditional statutory discrimination claim. For
example, in Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 258 the plaintiff’s Title VII quid pro
quo sexual harassment claim was dismissed as untimely, but the plaintiff also
brought a common law retaliatory discharge claim against the employer after
she was allegedly fired for refusing to accede to her supervisor’s sexual
advances. 259 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Arkansas law,
held that the discharge as alleged offended public policy and that Title VII
did not preempt the plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim. 260
While the retaliatory discharge tort is widely recognized, courts have
been reluctant to expand the tort beyond its present contours. 261 Common law
255. See Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation Claims in a PostCrawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253, 254–56 (discussing state statutes containing
anti-retaliation provisions).
256. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); see supra notes 106–107 and
accompanying text (discussing the tort of retaliatory discharge); see also Batteries Plus, LLC v. Mohr,
628 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Wis. 2001) (noting that the retaliatory discharge exception to the at-will rule
“properly balances the need to protect employees from terminations that contradict public policy with the
employer’s historical discretion to discharge employees under the freedom to contract embodied in the atwill doctrine”) (quoting Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 453 (Wis. 2000)).
257. See David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines
Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 657 (1996) (“The most rapid growth in the
number of jurisdictions recognizing the public policy exception occurred in the 1984–86 period, when
almost five states per year issued rulings recognizing the doctrine.”); see generally Corbett, supra note
12, at 466 (noting that it is “notoriously hard for plaintiffs to recover under the tort theory” of retaliatory
discharge).
258. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
259. Id. at 1203.
260. Id. at 1205-06.
261. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ill. 1994) (plurality
opinion) (noting disinclination to expand retaliatory discharge tort).
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retaliatory discharge claims exist against a backdrop of state statutes
providing employees with protection from retaliation for engaging in
whistleblowing, applying for workers’ compensation, and other similar
actions. 262 Therefore, an issue sometimes arises as to whether these statutes
should provide the exclusive remedy for affected employees. 263 Courts
frequently emphasize that the retaliatory discharge tort represents a narrow
exception to the traditional employment-at-will rule and that the tort should
not be expanded to the point that it unduly impacts employer discretion. 264
Thus, if a court believes that the public policy that is jeopardized by a
discharge can still be preserved without providing an employee the right to
sue over the discharge, the court is unlikely to recognize a retaliatory
discharge claim. 265
D. The Special Case of Retaliatory Discipline in Violation of Public Policy
As the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern illustrates,
employers may retaliate against employees in a manner that falls short of
outright discharge. As a result, some courts have grappled with the question
of whether tort law should provide a right to recover when an employer
demotes, transfers, or otherwise disciplines an employee in retaliation for the
employee having engaged in some form of protected conduct.
The 2019 New Hampshire Supreme Court decision in Clark v. New
Hampshire Department of Employment Security illustrates how such a claim
might arise. 266 In Clark, a supervisory public employee was allegedly
retaliated against after having reported concerns internally and externally
about various problems with interns within her organization, including
nepotism and wage theft. 267 The alleged retaliation included receiving a
negative work evaluation after having just recently received an excellent
evaluation, not receiving a promised promotion, and being laid off but then
offered a demotion to a non-supervisory position with a significant reduction

262. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.101–.105 (2020) (providing protection for private-sector
whistleblowers); W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (2020) (providing protection for employees who receive or
attempt to receive workers’ compensation benefits).
263. See Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 358 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Wash. 2015) (discussing the
issue of exclusivity).
264. See, e.g., Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 717 n.3 (Tenn. 1997) (“[T]his Court
has emphasized that the exception to the employment at-will doctrine must be narrowly applied and not
be permitted to consume the general rule.”).
265. See Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. 1991) (declining to recognize cause of action
for whistleblowing in-house counsel because “the public policy to be protected, that of protecting the lives
and property of citizens, is adequately safeguarded without extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to
in-house counsel”).
266. Clark v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 201 A.3d 652 (N.H. 2019).
267. Id. at 656. According to the employee, fifteen of the eighteen interns hired were related to upper
management. Appellant’s Brief at 6, Clark, 201 A.3d 652 (No. 2017-0658), 2018 WL 7815413, at *6.
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in pay. 268 The plaintiff also alleged that she was harassed at work and at
home: her car was egged, her home mailbox was smashed, she was prevented
from attending educational seminars and work meetings, and information
was withheld from her that made it difficult or impossible to perform her
job. 269 She brought several claims against the employer, including a statutory
whistleblower claim and what she classified as a wrongful demotion claim. 270
While acknowledging that the tort of retaliatory discharge may provide a
remedy for an employee who was fired for performing an act that public
policy would encourage or for refusing to do something that public policy
would condemn, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to recognize a
new cause of action based on wrongful demotion. 271
Cases like Clark would seem to provide courts with a perfect
opportunity to look to Title VII retaliation decisions for guidance. But despite
the similarities in purpose and structure, Burlington Northern’s material
adversity standard has done little to spur courts to recognize the tort of
retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy. 272 Numerous state courts
have adopted the material adversity standard when analyzing the antiretaliation provisions contained in their own similarly worded human rights
acts, whistleblower acts, and related statutes. 273 Few courts have considered
whether to recognize the tort of retaliatory discipline in violation of public
policy, and only a few of those have even referenced the Supreme Court’s
decision in Burlington Northern, let alone adopted it. 274 But those that have

Clark, 201 A.3d at 656–57.
Id.; Appellant’s Brief at 10–11, Clark, 201 A.3d 652 (No. 2017-0658), 2018 WL 7815413, at
*10–11. The employee’s unit was subjected to a reduction in force, which the employee alleged was in
retaliation for her actions. Clark, 201 A.3d at 656. The employee subsequently accepted a demotion in
lieu of being laid off. Id. Other alleged instances of retaliatory harassment from coworkers included being
taunted, being micromanaged, “being physically brushed or touched by other employees passing her,
being called names (‘ignorant’ and ‘witch’), being yelled at, having a printer temporarily taken away
(which had been given to her as an accommodation for a disability), which caused her increased pain
while she was without it, and having things thrown at her.” Appellant’s Brief at 10–11, Clark, 201 A.3d
652 (No. 2017-0658), 2018 WL 7815413, at *10–11.
270. Clark, 201 A.3d at 656.
271. Id. at 662.
272. The retaliatory discipline situation should also be distinguished from a constructive discharge
situation, in which conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to
quit. Such action may be actionable under a retaliatory discharge claim. See Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of
Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 464 (Wis. 2000).
273. See, e.g., Bereston v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95, 110 (D.C. 2018); Moore v. City of New
Brighton, 932 N.W.2d 317, 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019). But see Franklin v. Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427, 435
(Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (declining to adopt the standard based on differences in statutory text).
274. See infra notes 295–307 and accompanying text. An early draft of the Restatement of
Employment Law recognized the tort theory of retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy and
expressly relied upon Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard. See Harper, supra note 14, at
1331; Ann C. McGinley and Nicole Buonocore Porter, Public Policy and Workers’ Rights Wrongful
Discipline Actions and Good-Faith Beliefs, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 511, 518 (2017). Perhaps given
the lack of decisions recognizing the theory and the overall scarcity of decisions on the topic at all, the
268.
269.
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considered the issue are split, with a majority declining to recognize the cause
of action. 275 In many ways, the split parallels the split at the federal level
concerning the application of Burlington Northern’s material adversity
standard, with some courts reading the holding of Burlington Northern
narrowly and others applying it as it was intended—to provide employees
with broad protection against retaliation. 276
1. Decisions Recognizing the Tort of Retaliatory Discipline
For the courts that have been willing to recognize the cause of action,
providing for a remedy in the case of a retaliatory demotion, suspension, or
other adverse action is a “necessary and logical extension of the cause of
action for retaliatory discharge.” 277 The threat to public policy resulting from
the coercive effect of retaliation is effectively the same regardless of whether
an employee is fired or demoted or suffers some similar form of discipline. 278
In addition, these courts have suggested that not recognizing a claim of
retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy incentivizes employers to
final version of the Restatement was non-committal on the issue. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §
5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
275. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015). For decisions recognizing
the cause of action, see Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054, 1059–60 (Kan. 1997) (involving
demotion); Hill v. State, 448 P.3d 457, 469 (Kan. 2019) (recognizing claim where retaliatory action is
materially adverse); Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Neb. 2007) (involving demotion);
Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 232 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (involving suspension without
pay and demotion); Powers v. Springfield City Schs., No. 98-CA-10, 1998 WL 336782, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 26, 1998) (involving failure to promote). For decisions declining to recognize the cause of
action, see Clark v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 201 A.3d 652 (N.H. 2019) (involving demotion);
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1994) (plurality) (involving demotion);
White v. State, 929 P.2d 396 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (involving undesirable transfer); see also Turner v.
Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (declining to extend Tennessee
tort of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy to include employer action not involving actual
or constructive discharge); Freeman v. United Airlines, 52 F. App’x 95, 103 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying
Colorado law and declining to extend the retaliatory discharge cause of action to actions less severe than
actual or constructive discharge); Gallo v. Eaton Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D. Conn. 2000) (holding
that Connecticut would not recognize the tort of wrongful demotion in violation of public policy);
Bereston, 180 A.3d at 111 (expressing wariness of recognizing such a claim but deciding that even if such
a cause of action existed, plaintiff failed to show that employer’s actions were materially adverse); Mintz
v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the “tort of wrongful
failure-to-promote does not presently exist”). A third option taken by some courts is to decline to rule on
the specific issue and instead conclude that the retaliatory conduct is actionable under the retaliatory
discharge tort as a constructive discharge. See Hurst v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1202,
1207 (D. Idaho 2011) (declining to decide whether the Idaho Supreme Court would recognize the tort).
276. See supra notes 236–254 and accompanying text.
277. Brigham, 935 P.2d at 1059–60.
278. See id. at 1059 (“The employers’ violation of public policy and the resulting coercive effect on
the employee is the same in both situations.”); Trosper, 734 N.W.2d at 711 (stating that to refuse to
recognize a tort action in such instances “would compromise the [Nebraska’s Workers’ Compensation
Act] and would render illusory the cause of action for retaliatory discharge”); Powers, 1998 WL 336782,
at *7 (“To disallow a civil remedy under such circumstances would still ‘frustrate the policy and purposes’
of the law.”) (internal citation omitted).
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take forms of retaliatory action short of discharge in order to avoid liability,
thereby still thwarting the underlying public policy. 279
In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court expressly relied upon the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern in recognizing a tort claim
based on an allegedly retaliatory involuntary job transfer. 280 In Hill v. State,
the plaintiff—a public employee—was transferred to a unit on the other side
of the state, allegedly in retaliation for having appealed his suspension in
another workplace matter to the Kansas Civil Service Board. 281 The Kansas
Supreme Court had previously recognized the tort of retaliatory demotion, 282
but in this case, it was being asked to recognize a claim not involving any
loss of job status, pay, or benefits. 283 This time, the court looked to Burlington
Northern to explain how an involuntary transfer could have the same
coercive effect as a retaliatory demotion or discharge. 284 Ultimately, the court
expressly adopted Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard in
holding that a tort action “may be premised on any employment action that
is materially adverse to a reasonable employee, i.e., ‘harmful to the point that
[it] could well dissuade a reasonable worker from’ exercising” the
employee’s statutory rights. 285
2. Decisions Refusing to Recognize the Tort of Retaliatory Discipline
The courts that have declined to extend the reasoning behind the
retaliatory discharge tort to include non-discharge situations have offered
several justifications for their decisions. Perhaps the overarching concern
expressed is that recognizing such claims would, in the words of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Clark, unduly impede an employer’s ability to
“operate his business efficiently and profitably.” 286 Adopting a cause of
action based on something less than a retaliatory discharge “would interfere
with the employer’s right to manage its workplace, including its decisions
relating to the duties, responsibilities, and pay of its employees.” 287
According to these courts, recognition of the tort of retaliatory discipline
279. See Brigham, 935 P.2d at 1060 (stating that to refuse to recognize such a claim would be to send
such a message to employers, thereby repudiating the court’s recognition of a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge); Trosper, 734 N.W.2d at 711 (“If we fail to recognize a claim for retaliatory
demotion, it would create an incentive for employers to merely demote, rather than discharge, employees
who exercise their rights.”); Garcia, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (stating that refusing to permit recovery in the
context of an allegedly retaliatory suspension “would encourage employers to offer reinstatement after the
imposition of retaliatory punitive measures to avoid a plaintiff’s legitimate legal action”).
280. Hill v. State, 448 P.3d 457, 468–69 (Kan. 2019).
281. Id. at 462.
282. Brigham, 935 P.2d at 1055 (Kan. 1997).
283. Hill, 448 P.3d at 463.
284. Id. at 469.
285. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)).
286. Clark v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 201 A.3d 652, 661 (N.H. 2019).
287. Id. at 662.
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carries with it the risk that courts would “become increasingly involved in
the resolution of [all manner of] workplace disputes,” 288 becoming “super
personnel agencies.” 289 Recognizing these claims would drag courts into
workplace disputes that “center on employer conduct that heretofore has not
been actionable.” 290
Closely related to concerns about encroaching upon the employer
prerogative is the concern that recognizing claims for forms of retaliation
falling short of discharge would open up a host of potentially complicated
and fact-specific questions. For example, in considering whether to recognize
a claim based on allegedly retaliatory demotion and reduction in hours, the
Illinois Supreme Court highlighted some of its definitional concerns:
Although the term “demotion” may appear amenable to clear definition,
many questions arise: Is a demotion in title or status, but not salary,
actionable? Could a transfer from one department to another be considered a
demotion? Would it be fair to characterize as a demotion a significant
increase in an employee’s duties without an increase in salary? 291

In addition to concerns about how to define actionable retaliation, some
courts have expressed the fear that recognizing a cause of action based on
employer action short of discharge might also lead to an influx of frivolous
claims. 292
Some courts have also suggested that permitting retaliatory discipline
claims where statutes or collective bargaining agreements already constrain
employer behavior may upset the balance between the competing interests
struck by the legislature. 293 Others have declined to recognize a cause of
action where the retaliatory discipline does not result in a loss of job status,
pay, or benefits, reasoning that in such cases the employee has not suffered a
compensable injury. 294

288.

Bereston v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95, 111 (D.C. 2018).
White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 408 (Wash. 1997).
290. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ill. 1994).
291. Id.
292. See White, 929 P.2d at 408 (noting this concern); Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905
P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“Recognizing a retaliation tort for actions short of termination could
subject employers to torrents of unwarranted and vexatious suits filed by disgruntled employees at every
juncture in the employment process.”).
293. See White, 929 P.2d at 408 (stating that recognizing this cause of action would not strike the
appropriate balance and that “[t]his is particularly true in instances like this one where an employee’s
rights are already protected by civil service rule, by a collective bargaining agreement, and by civil rights
statutes”); see also Clark v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 201 A 3d 652, 661–62 (N.H. 2019) (noting the
existence of state statutory forms of protection in support of decision not to recognize cause of action).
294. See Sage Hill v. State, 388 P.3d 122, 148 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 448
P.3d 457 (Kan. 2019).
289.
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3. The Failure to Statutify the Tort of Retaliatory Discipline in
Violation of Public Policy
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the decisions ruling on whether
to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to retaliatory discipline is how little
influence the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern has had on
the development of the common law. The Hill decision from Kansas—
coming some thirteen years after Burlington Northern—appears to be the
first time that a majority opinion from a state appellate court expressly
considered the reasoning and holding from Burlington Northern in deciding
to recognize the theory. 295 The courts that have refused to recognize the tort
of retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy have largely ignored the
decision. To be fair, some of the initial decisions on the subject came before
Burlington Northern. But, as new cases have come before courts and courts
have revisited past decisions, discussion of the Burlington Northern decision
is still infrequent at best.
To the extent that courts acknowledge the existence of the material
adversity standard, the standard has had little influence. For example, the
D.C. Court of Appeals had previously adopted the material adversity standard
for use in retaliation claims brought pursuant to the District’s Human Rights
Act. 296 Therefore, one might expect the court to have been predisposed to
adopt this standard for use in the analogous tort context. Instead, the court
avoided the issue and expressed a wariness of “attempting to resolve [the]
competing policy considerations by judicial fiat” 297 by recognizing a
common law claim of wrongful or retaliatory discipline.
The failure of state courts to look to federal law on the issue of whether
to recognize a common law claim of retaliatory discipline when an identical
or similar standard is already in effect seems particularly surprising in light
of the tendency of state courts to adopt federal courts’ interpretations of
parallel federal statutes. Indeed, many state courts have adopted the material
adversity standard when interpreting their own state anti-discrimination
statutes 298 and in First Amendment retaliation cases. 299 Numerous state
295. The case had been cited previously in a concurring opinion. Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 734
N.W.2d 704, 715 (Neb. 2007) (Gerrard, J., concurring).
296. Bereston v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95, 112 (D.C. 2018).
297. Id. at 111.
298. See Chen v. Wayne State Univ., 771 N.W.2d 820, 839 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that
an employer’s action must be materially adverse to qualify as actionable retaliation under Michigan’s
Civil Rights Act); Bereston, 180 A.3d at 112 n.49 (explaining that retaliation is actionable where it would
have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)).
299. See Nairn v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 229, 244 (Tex. App. 2012) (employing
Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard in public employee’s First Amendment retaliation
case); Montgomery Cty. v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610, 617 (Tex. 2007) (employing Burlington Northern’s
material adversity standard in claim brought under the Whistleblower Act). Minnesota appears to have
amended its whistleblower statutes to track Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard. See Minn.
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whistleblower statutes and similar statutes also prohibit employer retaliation
short of discharge. 300 Some whistleblower statutes specifically list employer
actions such as transfers, reprimands, substandard performance reviews—or
even the threat of such actions—as sufficient to constitute unlawful
retaliation. 301
Aside from the fact that the two situations are strikingly similar, this
failure to consider Burlington Northern is particularly surprising given that
the decision speaks to the same issues state courts confront when deciding
whether to recognize retaliatory discipline claims. For example, Burlington
Northern addresses concerns over permitting recovery for the sorts of nonmaterial employer decisions that take place every day in the workplace, 302
and there are dozens of lower court opinions that pick up on this theme and
address it in varying ways. 303 The Supreme Court’s decision and those of
lower courts also address the concern over the supposed lack of harm in such
cases. The Burlington Northern opinion makes clear that an employee may
suffer compensable harm even in the absence of financial injury. 304 Indeed,
as the facts of the case illustrate, some materially adverse retaliation may
produce serious emotional distress. 305 And, post-Burlington Northern, where
employees have been unable to identify specific economic injury or
emotional distress resulting from unlawful retaliation, lower courts have been
willing to award nominal damages 306—a form of compensation that is often
Stat. §§ 181.932, 181.931, subd. 5 (2018) (prohibiting an employer from penalizing an employee by
engaging in “conduct that might dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a report”).
Minnesota’s statute was amended in 2013, seven years after the Burlington Northern decision. See id.
300. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (2016) (prohibiting a supervisor from discharging, demoting,
transferring, or otherwise discriminating against a state employee who reports a violation of law); 50 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 725/7 (2018) (prohibiting police officers from being “discharged, disciplined, demoted,
denied promotion or seniority, transferred, reassigned or otherwise discriminated against in regard to his
or her employment, or be[ing] threatened with any such treatment as retaliation for or by reason of his or
her exercise of the rights granted by this Act”).
301. See ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (listing transfer); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-102 (2017)
(listing “reprimand, admonishment, unsatisfactory or below standard performance evaluation, reduction
in force, or withholding of work, or the threat of any such discipline or penalty); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
395/.01 (2018) (listing transfer).
302. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (reiterating that Title VII does
not set forth a “general civility code for the American workplace” and discussing the need to focus on
objectively material actions).
303. See supra notes 236–254 and accompanying text.
304. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67, 72.
305. The plaintiff was suspended without pay for thirty-seven days. Even though she was reinstated
and given back pay, she claimed to have suffered emotional distress as a result of the suspension. Id. at
72. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s compensatory damages award, which also included an award
for medical treatment the plaintiff sought as a result of the distress she suffered. Id. at 73.
306. See, e.g., Hale v. Emporia State Univ., 2019 WL 6700367, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2019)
(awarding punitive damages where plaintiff failed to introduce evidence sufficient to justify an award of
compensatory damages); Benton v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nos. 3:06–cv–1591–D & 3:07–cv–144–D,
2014 WL 2862309, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2014) (“A plaintiff who establishes a violation of Title VII
but fails to prove emotional distress or other actual damages can recover nominal damages.”); see also
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available in intentional tort cases. 307 Courts have also recognized a plaintiff’s
right to recover under Title VII for such non-pecuniary harm as damage to
reputation and lost future earnings, which are common law remedies that
should similarly be available under a common law retaliatory discipline
claim. 308
4. Why Courts Should Statutify the Tort of Retaliatory Discipline in
Violation of Public Policy
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern adopting a
material adversity standard in the case of employer retaliation is unassailable
in terms of its text-based analysis and its policy-based reasoning. The
question is what influence, if any, this statutory rule should have on tort law
involving the workplace. A judge who focuses heavily on the deterrent
functions of tort law might be inclined to recognize the retaliatory discipline
tort based on the strong policy concerns identified by the Court in Burlington
Northern. But these concerns could be expected to carry less weight for
judges who take a narrower view of the proper role of tort law and are
concerned about the impact that the material adversity rule would have on
employer discretion. Regardless of what view of tort law a judge takes, an
inquiry into the Burlington Northern standard and its role within the broader
framework of statutory retaliation should lead a court to recognize the tort
theory of retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy.
The current landscape of statutory retaliation law provides guidance to
judges as they wrestle with the concern that recognizing the tort might intrude
upon the traditional discretion afforded to employers. Courts that have
refused to recognize tort claims based on employer actions short of discharge
often cite the concern that doing so “would interfere with the employer’s right
to manage its workplace, including its decisions relating to the duties,
responsibilities, and pay of its employees.” 309 But Burlington Northern’s
material adversity standard has already spread through judicial decisions
involving federal statutes and many state statues to the point that employers
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 561 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that “placement on administrative
leave may carry with it both the stigma of the suspicion of wrongdoing and possibly significant emotional
distress”); Baird v. Snowbarger, 744 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing emotional distress
caused by retaliatory action to be a form of injury or harm); Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d
1079, 1091 n.8 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that even if a plaintiff must prove emotional distress or financial
injury in order to establish the existence of a materially adverse action, the fact that plaintiff suffered such
distress would be sufficient). See generally Elmore v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 183 F. Supp. 3d
58, 66 (D.D.C. 2016) (recognizing that an act that puts an employee at risk of physical injury qualifies as
a materially adverse action).
307. See, e.g., Biglane v. Under The Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 17 (Miss. 2007) (noting that nominal
damages can be awarded for trespass and battery).
308. See Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 1998).
309. See Clark v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 201 A.3d 652, 662 (N.H. 2019); supra notes 286–290
and accompanying text.
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are already prohibited from engaging in retaliatory actions short of discharge
in a wide variety of scenarios. Federal courts have held that employers are
not permitted to take materially adverse retaliatory actions against employees
who oppose unlawful employer conduct on the basis of, inter alia, race, color,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, the exercise of rights related to
medical leave or overtime pay, and the filing of health-and-safety-related
complaints. 310 In interpreting similarly worded state employment statutes,
state courts have regularly adopted this standard and have also applied it to
state whistleblower statutes. 311
In short, even a cursory review of statutory retaliation law on the part of
a state court leads to the conclusion that the material adversity standard has
now essentially replaced the at-will rule as the default rule in statutory
workplace retaliation cases, applying to a host of discretionary activities on
the part of employers that were traditionally unregulated. This fact alone
dramatically undercuts the argument that recognizing the retaliatory
discipline tort would encroach upon employer discretion or legislative
prerogative. If common law evolves over time to reflect changing realities,
the reality is that under statutory law, employers enjoy considerably less
freedom to retaliate against employees who engage in protected activities
than they once did. 312 Recognizing the tort of retaliatory discipline is but a
natural step in the evolution of common law regarding the workplace, and it
is a step that is fully supported by the state of statutory law. 313

310. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60–62 (2006) (citing cases); Adams
v. Anne Arundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying material adversity
standard to retaliation claims involving the ADA); Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (applying material adversity standard to ADEA retaliation claim); Freelain v. Village of Oak Park,
888 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying material adversity standard to retaliation claims involving
FMLA); Tooker v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 522 S.W.3d 545, 562–63 (Tex. App. 2017) (applying material
adversity standard to retaliation claims involving the FLSA); Perez v. E. Awning Sys., Inc., 2018 WL
4926447, at *7 (D. Conn. Oct. 9, 2018) (applying material adversity standard to OSHA retaliation claim).
311. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
312. Courts advanced similar arguments when first beginning to recognize the tort of retaliatory
discharge in violation of public policy. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842 (Wis.
1983) (“Given the expanding role of the government in labor relations, it is entirely appropriate that the
common law now recognize established constitutional and statutory policies in employment
relationships.”).
313. The judge who has reservations about recognizing a retaliatory discipline tort might also find
potential solace in the fact that numerous courts—incorrectly, in my opinion—have adopted a narrow
interpretation of the material adversity standard that guarantees that courts will not become superpersonnel departments. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Tort law and statutory law can complement and inform each other as
legislatures and courts attempt to address wrongful conduct. 314 There should
be nothing terribly surprising about this idea. What is surprising is how
poorly this interactive process has played out in the context of employment
law. Federal courts interpreting employment discrimination statutes have
sometimes imported tort principles in clunky or arguably inappropriate ways.
Conversely, state courts have often overlooked or consciously ignored
statutory law involving the workplace that could shed light on analogous tort
law issues.
It would be a mistake for state courts to engage in wholesale
statutification of tort law involving the workplace in the same way that
federal courts have engaged in the tortification of employment discrimination
law. But there is still potentially something to be gained by looking to the law
decided under employment statutes when considering clearly analogous tort
issues. In some instances, this process may simply allow courts to develop
better-reasoned tort rules for use in the workplace. In others, such as the case
of the tort of retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy, the law that
has developed under analogous workplace statutes may prove applicable for
use in tort law. As a result, tort law may provide an additional source of
protection for employees, filling in the gaps when statutory law offers no
remedy.

314. See Brady, supra note 19, at 1187 (discussing the “iterative process” that courts and legislatures
undertake to address shortcomings in the law).
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